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ABSTRACT
Adults have characterised infants as incompetent in action and cogni¬
tion. An- alternative interpretation which characterises infants as
different rather than deficient is asserted. This alternative expla¬
nation is derived from an analysis using the formal categories of
standard propositional logic. The analysis provides a structure
within which all cognitive differences can be formally defined. The
thesis suggests that formal characterisation is a necessity if pro¬
gress is to be made from behavioural descriptions to cognitive expla¬
nations. The resultant interpretation is affirmed as an initial
attempt towards a cognitive explanation of the mental world of the
infant.
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1. METHODS The focus of psychology has always been the human
being. The methods used to investigate this object of enquiry are
myriad. Inferences have been made about human nature via the
armchair, laboratory, society, ape, rat, crab and drug-induced state.
The aetiology of these different inferences vary, but their purpose
is uniform. Psychologists attempt to understand human nature by
constructing systems of knowledge relevant to particular aspects of
it, and this leads to a certain 'reflective' problem. Psychological
accounts may explain how systems of knowledge relevant to perception,
language, feelings, society, skills, identity, abnormality or indeed
any aspect of humanity, originate and develop but these accounts must
eventually account for themselves. Psychologists must then construct
knowledge systems about systems of knowledge. The knowledge sought
is often self-knowledge.
The systems of knowledge constructed by psychologists are said to be
accepted or not depending on their parsimony; communicability; con¬
sistency; refutability; the final appeal always being to evidence
rather than style. New theory assimilates old data while making
predictions about 'new' data.
Some workers have suggested that psychology possesses few theories
because of the unnecessarily rigorous criteria used in assessing
theoretical adequacy.
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"What has happened, in fact, is that psychology has been
asked to confront questions that are simply dismissed in the
case of the natural sciences, where no one is much concerned
with the fact that two samples might in principle be dif¬
ferently constructed, that theories are undetermined by evi¬
dence, and so on. This seems a strange state of affairs
It is a fair rule of thumb that questions shall not be
raised concerning the foundations of psychology if they can¬
not be answered in some measure at least in the case of phy¬
sics. This reasonable principle has been drastically violat¬
ed with the obvious consequences that nothing much comes of
the discussion, even when confusions are eliminated." (Chom¬
sky 1980)
Such criticisms, however telling in the abstract, are in practice
misdirected. ' Psychologists have accepted that theories are under-
determined by evidence without generally being aware of the various
formulations of "indeterminacy'. Descartes "Thesis of Indeter¬
minacy' is one of the most general and subsumes most others. For
example, Quine's "indeterminacy of translation' thesis can be seen as
the application of Descartes formulation to the linguistic domain.
Descartes thesis is simply stated; no matter how much evidence is
gathered, alternative interpretations must always be available. No
one interpretation can ever be said to be unassailably correct or
true. Descartes avoids heresy by including in his proof the point
that the mind of the "great Artificer' must always be opaque to the
mind of man.
"..so doubtless there is an infinity of different ways in
which all things that we see could be formed by the great Ar¬
tificer (without it being possible for the mind of man to be
aware of which of these means he has chosen to employ)."
(Descartes 1968, Descartes )
Acceptance of underdetermination rather than indeterminacy leads
workers to the paradoxical conclusion that the proper task of
psychology is data acquisition. The problem becomes not too many
interpretations rather too much evidence. The diversity, complexity
and, most often, sheer bulk of "facts' result in the judgement that
no theory is adequate; indeed no theory could possibly assimilate
the extant data.
For one hundred years, from James through Husserl to Fodor and Chom¬
sky, doubts have been articulated about such a stance. These doubts
are often rebutted by a curious inversion. Their undeniable power
is ignored, apart from forcing an entry into faculty folk-lore,
because the arguments are seen as eschatological and therefore
irrelevant. When the revolution comes we may judge ourselves, but
until then, any judgements are premature. This attitude has been
variously defended; description precedes explanation; difficult
questions may require unsatisfactory answers; psychology is a young
science; theory not grounded in data remains armchair speculation;
observation and experiment are the only starting points of the scien¬
tific method.
One may view these articulations as empirical or ostrich-like. What
is clear is that in all the major areas of psychology (cognition,
perception, developmental, social, language, abnormal, learning,
skills) data exists without theory. The primacy of the data is
accepted to the extent that data-acquisition is seen as an end in
itself, as a worthwhile endeavour. Data is represented as facts
obtained from reality and consistently available to all if the method
of acquisition is identical. This representation of psychology as
institutionally based, task-oriented and contextually bound may iron¬
ically be questioned because the appropriate studies have not been
done. But few workers would deny that psychology is data-heavy.
Psychology supports the weight of facts, figures, statistical ana¬
lyses, situational descriptions and isolated experiments by transfer-
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ring the burden back to the data. Data is granted primacy and
autonomy. Further, where no theory exists, data stands as substi¬
tute. This view of the tasks of psychology is coherent and con¬
sistent with the belief that psychological theory is underdetermined
by evidence.
Another view of the goals of psychology is compatible with the thesis
of indeterminacy. This alternative view starts from the implica¬
tions of indeterminacy. There is no such thing as an unambiguously
correct interpretation and an inventory of the total contents of a
thing would require an infinite process. Thus, there exists an
infinite amount of data. Data collection can never be complete.
Uncertainty about the status of the missing parts of the inventory
means that all components must be allocated equal status. Summa¬
tions or generalisations remain part of the inventory and are liable
to incompleteness and uncertainty. Rational choice between part-
inventories is misdirected because part-inventories cannot be in
opposition. Interpretative fecundity changes the status of the data
acquired. Ambiguity is accepted as necessary in all but formally
constrained systems, but the data remains unambiguous. Data is
represented as factual, existent, as a thing. Things are neither
ambiguous nor unambiguous, they just are. Data is not an interpre¬
tation but something about which interpretations, inherently ambigu¬
ous, are made.
These two views are themselves only interpretations and are not in
opposition. The status of theory in both cases is the same. The
interpretation, theory or system of knowledge is seen as the end-
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point in the endeavour. It is in the construction of the theory
that these two views differ.
The "underdetermined' view assumes that most of the relevant data can
be acquired; that unimportant data can be, somehow, excluded and
that the data acquired will constrain or shape the possible interpre¬
tations until only a few, or ideally one, remain. This view delivers
primacy and autonomy to data.
The * indeterminacy' view accepts that all the data can never be
acquired, that important data may not be illuminated and admits to
different interpretations from any, even all, available data. This
view asserts that data possesses no immanent guiding principles; may
fit contradictory interpretations; has no scientific meaning outwith
an interpretation and may be factual, because observed, but unin¬
teresting .
The problem for both views is not one of data-acquisition, but one of
choice. The investigators have chosen the strategy which will lead
to construction of interesting knowledge systems, but what data is to
be gathered remains unspecified. The underdetermined choice of
interesting data is the result of a mix of historical accident, per¬
sonal preference, intuition, formal necessity and practical con¬
siderations. The indeterminacy approach is extremely difficult to
translate into practical action and construction. Very few analyses
can be seen to have abandonned all value judgements with respect to
data. Preferential treatment is inherent in both gathering and
not-gathering.
The aim of this thesis is to show that when an "indetermininistic'
approach is applied, illuminating interpretations can be constructed.
The phenomenon under analysis can be treated as theory-neutral. The
choice of what data is to be gathered is dictated only by formal
necessities. The explication of this shedding of very subtle preju-
dices is a preliminary to the construction of a value-free knowledge





2.J[. Research into the areas of development, cognition, infancy and
the convergence of these areas, cognitive development in infancy, has
been described as burgeoning, simply remarkable, mushrooming and of
an ever increasing rate. The majority of this research is derived
from only two theories, Behaviourism and Genetic Epistemology.
These two theories have generated, often by dissent, the bulk of the
research in this domain, but they remain the only systematic accounts
of the cognitive development of the infant. They dominate the
separate, but related attempts to account for the learning and
development exhibited by the infant.
The theoretical content of behaviourism is deliberately minimal
(operant, respondent, rate of response). Piaget's psychological, as
opposed to his formal, theories are equally terse (assimilation,
equilibration, accommodation). Their nomological content may be
characterised as respond and equilibrate.
As a result of the recent research effort, the diversity and numbers
of conditions and subjects has increased, but the structure of the
various theories remains remarkably unaltered. The scope and depth
of the research, and the criticism to which it has been subjected
make this phenomenon of theoretical inertia very surprising.
It is apodictic that an increased research effort should produce a
commensurate change in knowledge. If knowledge is regarded as
theory, interpretation or knowledge-system and not description, then
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the research effort in this domain has failed. An increase in
research effort in the domain of cognitive development in infancy has
resulted in few theoretical changes. Descriptions have multiplied;
explanations have not.
2.2. Criticisms of these theories demonstrate the weakness of the
investigative strategy. This invariably takes the form of producing
experimental results which the particular theory cannot assimilate
and has not predicted. Curiously, this provides support for the
theory opposed. Piaget's work, in particular, has been reinforced by
this cycle of misdirected opposition. To oppose, one needs an oppo¬
site not a vacuum. The bulk of research in this area is inadequate
because alternative theories are not formulated and examined. Camus
makes the point more lyrically. "The blasphemy is reverent since
every blasphemy is ultimately participation in holiness." One must
believe in two gods to oppose one. Thus a view which delivers pri¬
macy and autonomy to data and evidence rather than interpretations
must act, albeit reluctantly, conservatively. The particular theory
under analysis can never lose status because of the research effort;
interpretations are never produced merely reinforced.
This implication of failure does not extend to the theories; their
value is increased, but the problem for the worker engaged in
theory-construction is to identify those aspects of the extant
theories upon which a constructive contrast can be based. Once iden¬
tified, these features can be analysed and productive reinterpreta-
tion can take place. This approach can only succeed if the investi¬
gator is explicit about the basic principles and assumptions accepted
or rejected.
A basic assumption of this thesis is that a rational, coherent
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explanation of the infant's^ cognitive development is possible. This
assumption may not meet with universal approval. Entry into defini¬
tional debates can be avoided by noting that affirmation of the con¬
verse forces one to abandon the domain altogether. Acceptance of
the assumption means that a story can be told; denial means that one
cannot take psychology in the domain seriously.
Behaviourism and Genetic Epistemology probably owe their longevity to
acceptance of this principle. Both provide serious explanations of
cognitive development. Their theoretical structure is similar in
three other important respects. They are both committed to a direc¬
tional analysis of their subject; both accept a gap between theory
proposed and empirical evidence; and inherent in each is the belief
that the knowledge systems constructed must conform to formal rules.
2.3. Directionality Construction of schemas and learning of S-R
chains are attempts to explain transitions in knowledge-systems.
Analysis proceeds by a comparative procedure. The end point of the
analysis - the rational adult - is kept in sight and the infant, at
whatever stage, is modelled against the adult. This charting of the
development of the infant with reference to a point of 'maximum'
development or 'complete' learning is an explicit feature of both
theories. The analysis is given direction and the direction is
given a value.
"It is clear that the model imputes a certain directionality,
even a certain teleology, to ontogenetic development."
(Flavell 1963)
"Our problem is to explain how the transition is made from a
lower level of knowledge to a level that is judged to be
higher." (Piaget 1970b)
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Directional or teleological analysis is essential to a complete
explanation, but in isolation in this domain, it delivers a highly-
charged value judgement which is necessarily pejorative. The cogni¬
tive history of the individual is written in identification of defi¬
cits, gaps or errors; learning and development is charted with
respect to these errors.
The young infant is characterised as a poor survivor, immoral,
vacant, unprogrammed, inadequate, egocentric, undifferentiated,
illogical, elementary and incompetent. Piaget represents the
psychic activity of the first few months of life as "simple, fixed,
elementary, undifferentiated and chaotic." (Piaget 1955) The litera¬
ture is replete with similar judgements.
"When viewed through the eyes of a cognitive developmental-
ist, the child of five years or younger is remarkably inept."
(Gelman 1978)
"Genetic epistemology deals with both the formation and the
meaning of knowledge - by what means does the human mind go
from a state of less sufficient knowledge to a state of
higher knowledge." (Piaget 1970a)
"(The child) receives from (the Cooperation) the instruments
necessary to extend the rational construction prepared during
the first two years of life and to expand it into a system of
logical relationships and adequate representations." (Piaget
1955)
The conclusions of this directional analysis are nearly always nega¬
tive; the story of the infant is told in terms of failure not suc¬
cess. The established concepts of science (objects, space, time,
causality, logic and numbers) are said to be beyond the cognitive
grasp of the young infant.
The adult scientist is here displaying the egocentrism which is
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judged pejoratively in the infant. The infant's conception of suc¬
cess and failure; adequacy and inadequacy; truth and falsehood may
differ from the adult's so much as to render the above analysis inap¬
propriate. The adult denies that other values or interpretations
can exist. Analogously, one could judge pole-vault.ers according to
their singing ability. Neither judges nor pole-vaulters would be
impressed.
Competence and incompetence are both valid objects of inquiry, but
competence is the more revealing. Inquiry into incompetence may
disguise a negative hypothesis but it cannot disguise the fact that
analysis of the infant is directional. The cognitive structure of
the infant may remain impenetrable to the adult until a causal
analysis of the infant's competence is attempted.
2.4. Theory and Evidence Most workers accept some form of the
indeterminacy thesis. Theories are always going to deliver ambigu¬
ous predictions and one can never be certain about the status of
undiscovered systems. The practical exigencies of working in a
natural system means that this thesis must sometimes be ignored; the
worker must act as if theories are underdetermined.
Similarly, the gap between empirical evidence and the predictions of
the knowledge systems is accepted as a theoretical necessity, but
often ignored through practical necessity. The empirical evidence
may only adumbrate the theory, but the worker must act as if the evi¬
dence absolutely constrains the theory. The relationship between
theory and evidence is ambiguous, uncertain and opaque, but practical
science demands that it be unambiguous, certain and clear. These
working assumptions are unavoidable, but they appear to generate two
errors of judgement, one relevant to measurement, the other relevant
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to the status of the evidence.
2.4.J.. Measurement The questions: 'How much learning?': 'How much
development?' have never been answered. It is an open secret among
behaviourists that quantification is restricted to more and less.
What is worse is that:-
"Since the available measures are always measures of perfor¬
mance, these questions all involve the problems of transfer¬
ring such measures into units appropriate to describe the de¬
gree of learning. At the present time, such units have not
been developed. In fact, there is not even complete agree¬
ment as to exactly what constitutes a measurable response in
the learning situation. For example, given the fact that
with practice an organism can learn to respond rapidly, vi¬
gorously or persistently, is it appropriate to use speed, vi¬
gour and persistence as if they were quantitative reflections
of the strength of some underlying process?" (Kimble 1961)
This candid statement accepts that the learning theorists do not
know what to measure or how to measure. There is no base-line for
learning apart from arbitrary or phenomenal limits imposed by the
particular worker. In general, there is considerable agreement as to
the phenomenal, developmental or macro measures (eg stages within the
development of the object concept) and considerable disagreement as
to the arbitrary, behavioural or micro measures (eg completion of the
process of acquiring an instrumental response). But in both cases
there is a danger that the measures will cease being regarded as
measures of something and start being regarded as ends in themselves.
Indeed, they can be treated as phenomena in their own right: for
many behaviourists, learning is nothing more nor less than rate of
response; for many Piagetians, development is nothing more nor less
than temporal charting with regard to classic stage errors. But the
process of reification is a manifest error if the underlying process
or system of knowledge remains the overt object of inquiry. If the
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system of knowledge retains its original status, then the measures
remain measures and should not be treated otherwise.
2.4.2. Status If the research is directed towards the elucidation
of the formal system underlying development, then the investigator
seeks the best-fitting formal system, not the performance variables
that operate on this system. There is general agreement that the
status of any evidence is diminished because of performance vari¬
ables .
"Most theorists either assert or imply that the level of
learning, itself, provides a hypothetical upper limit which
performance would reflect directly under absolutely ideal
conditions. Unfortunately, however, conditions never are
completely optimal; and performance, therefore, always un¬
derestimates the level of learning to a degree which varies
directly with the extent to which the training conditions
depart from the ideal - it is very difficult to isolate the
learning process and to study it alone in any given situa¬
tion." (Kimble 1961)
Again the theorist must act as if the evidence acquired is more than
an approximation to the knowledge system. An error of judgement
occurs only if the investigative focus is transferred to the perfor¬
mance variables. The learning theorist or developmentalist may not
know what or how to measure and must admit that any possible measures
are approximations or indirect manifestations of the object of
inquiry, but behaviour can deliver insights into the formal organisa¬
tion of the mind. Unfortunately, psychology compiles an ever
increasing list of performance variables which operate on behaviour
and forgets that the formal system was the original research target.
"Here stands an imposing system of logical propositions and
their various transformations, elsewhere stands Piaget's body
of empirical data on cognition at different genetic levels;
and yet there is not the slightest attempt to effect any real
liaison between them." (Flavell 1963)
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Flavell's conclusion is revealing. The Theory - Evidence distinc¬
tion, inherent throughout Piaget's work, is made explicit. But
Flavell does not ask the more interesting question. If the empiri¬
cal data on cognition is not relevant to a formal model, to what
model is the data relevant? What theory is inferred from the assem¬
bled facts? If a psychological theory is necessarily informal, then
a serious attempt to match the logical with the psychological will
never succeed. The psychologist is reduced to collecting * empirical'
data with no theory in mind. This stance is coherent only if the
psychologist accepts the descriptionist label and gives up the
pretence of theory construction.
2.5. CONCLUSIONS Certain limitations are evident in learning and
development research.
(1) Research has become fixed on two theories. Alternative theoret¬
ical constructions are rare.
(2) Inherent in a directional analysis based on incompetence are:
a) A fixation with adult values
b) Pejorative value-judgements
c) Negative hypotheses.
(3) The gap between theory and evidence generates two errors.
a) The instrumental means, the evidence or measures, may
become a substitute for the terminal value, the system
of knowledge.
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b) The performance variables which operate on the evidence
may become a substitute for the terminal value, the sys¬
tem of knowledge.
The worker who takes psychology seriously may not, however, be
mislead. The first principle, seriousness, is not an abstract value.
Being serious about the systems constructed means committing oneself
to following formal rules rather than values created by other means
whether historical, accidental or practical.
Being serious about the cognitive infant means explicating the formal





3. The cognitive processes of the infant can be investigated by
attempting to answer two questions.
a) What cognitive structure must the infant possess to exhibit
observed behaviour?
b) What cognitive structure must the infant possess to allow
development to later structures?
Theories can be compared and contrasted using their answers to these
two questions.
2-1. Behaviourists claim that all observed behaviour and development
can be satisfactorily explained by attributing to the infant the
structure which allows a connection to be made between respondent and
reinforcement or operant and reinforcement. The infant is said to
possess the ability to make a connection between stimulus and
response. Respondent reinforcement is seen in the infants response
of sucking to the stimulus of the nipple. Operant reinforcement is
seen in the infants response of crying to the stimulus of hunger.
Piagetians claim that all observed behaviour and development can be
satisfactorily explained by attributing to the infant the capability
for progressive evocation of conceptual structures through action.
The conceptual structures, whose change constitutes development,
emerge through the application of the functional invariant of
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adaptation to extant organisations. The infant is said to possess
the ability to make a connection between action and cognitive struc¬
ture mediated by adaptation.
Both theories postulate an initial cognitive structure which is
essentially impoverished compared to later structures. Both
theories postulate an initial cognitive functioning restricted to a
few, very general principles of application. Behaviourism states
that function is a process best characterised by crude association-
ism; genetic epistemology states that function is a process best
characterised by adaptation. Investigation proceeds by examination
of the infant's progressive application of these principles. The
interest moves from the function to its varied application in the
world.
A serious attempt, dedicated to an alternative interpretation of the
infant's cognitive processes, can only be made if the cognitive
processes are open to investigation. The structure and function
fixed by these two theories must be freed and the theoretical monol¬
iths of reinforcement and equilibration given up. Only then can an
alternative analysis proceed.
Assume that the infant is not a crude associator or a homeostat.
As an alternative, assume only that the infant can reason logically.
3.2. This alternative assumption implies that all observed behaviour
and development can be satisfactorily explained by attributing to the
infant the capability for logical thought. This imputation of
infantile logic, until specified, will provide merely a translation
of the answers already given by behaviourism and genetic epistemol¬
ogy. The specification of the logical processes must eventually
differentiate this interpretation from any other. An interpretation
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which is not thus distinguished cannot be said to make a valuable
contribution to knowledge. By itself, a reformulation in terms of
logical propositions, whether of stimulus and response or of schemas
and actions is worthless.
Assume that the logical processes of the infant can be characterised
by a specification of structure and function which distances this
explanation from others. In terms of structure, differentiation can
only be in one direction. A specification of the logic must produce
an initial cognitive structure which is essentially rich compared to
that proposed by preceding theories. A specification of the logic
must produce an initial cognitive functioning restricted to logical
rather than psychological, behavioural or dynamic principles. The
logical principles proposed must operate on, or adumbrate, a struc¬
ture different from those already proposed. The experimenter must
ensure that a structural difference is generated and success, in this
respect, is guaranteed if very specific logical principles are
applied to the infant. Similarly, any comparison or contrastive may
be clarified by consideration of the extreme conditions generated by
the different components.
Treatment of the infant as "remarkably inept" will always produce a
simple initial structure; treatment of the infant as remarkably
adept will always produce a more complex initial structure. A
genuine attempt at a reinterpretation of the psychic activity of the
first few months of life must assume that the cognitive processes
operating in these months are complex, differentiated and systematic.
The best way of ensuring this is to assume that the infant has all
the logical attributes displayed at all later levels of development.
The level of logical development said to be most divergent from the
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infant's level is that of the adult logician.
Assume that the logical infant is as adept as the logical adult.
Then the laws and principles which characterise adult logic should
also characterise infantile logic. Their application may change but
their existence may not. Standard logic is a logic generated by the
adult logician.
.3.3. Classical logic is, as the name implies, generally accepted as
a base from which other logics can be specified. There are three
basic principles of classical logic which because of their fundamen¬
tal nature have become know as the Laws of Logic.
a) The Law of Identity : If p then p.
b) The Law of Contradiction : Never [p and not-p].
c) The law of the Excluded Middle : Always [p or not-p].
These principles, can only be modelled in a two-value system, the two
values being True(T) and False(F); no intermediate values are possi¬
ble.
Thus:
From a) the Truth value of p is uniform in all its occurrences.
From b) p and not-p cannot both be true or both be false.
From c) since either p will be True or not-p will be True,
it is always the case that the disjuction will be True.
If the infants logical structure can be characterised by classical
logic then these principles and structure must also apply to the
infant. But the behaviour of the infant has never been examined
under the above assumptions.
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3.4. Data acquisition has never been carried out for the basic ques¬
tions generated by the above assumptions. Extant data has been pro¬
duced with unspecified logical aims. The evinced object of inquiry,
the formal system underlying behaviour, has been replaced by
behaviour in a particular situation. Interest has been directed at
the level of the behaviour, thus the categorisation of research
interest by task. But these assumptions change the methodological
alternatives.
The relationship between independent and dependent variables must be
expressed propositionally and represented within a truth table using
only the values True(T) and False(F). The truth table provides a
convenient, exhaustive and value-free analysis of the formal struc¬
ture of any situation and will eventually be used to define the logi¬
cal structure of the infant.
Results must be relevant to the question of exhibited behaviour, no
/
indirect speculations are allowed.
Results must be positive. Results must be relevant to competence
not incompetence. Infant's observed competence will provide a base
against which negative results, such as stage errors in object con¬
cept tasks, can be placed.
Results must be relevant to early logical structures.
Logical assumptions also change the interrogative alternatives.
3.5, Questions
1) Does the infant use a two-value system(True and False) ?
2) What is the infant's construction of negation?
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3) Is the infant's logic synchronically fixed or flexible?
4) If flexible, is the logic reversible?
5) What is the import of propositional content?
6) What is the interaction between affirmation and negation at and
between the different propositional categories?
a) Behaviour
b) External world
c) Logical relationship between a) and b).
7) What characteristics of logic structure and function can be
identified by asking:
a) What conditions are optimal for learning(assimilation)?
b) What conditions are optimal for development(accommodation)?
c) Under what conditions^does the infant find its own theories
untenable(extinction)?
.3.6. Conclusions Assumptions of differences between old and new
theories lead to the following hypotheses:
a) The important learning and developmental mechanisms are in place
from birth.
b) Logical structure and function can be characterised by classical
logic.
c) This structure and function having been specified is open to
investigation.
21
Data must be collected relevant to the questions raised in 3.5 The
infant must be observed in a situation where behaviourism, genetic
epistemology and logical representation can be applied.
Theoretical choice can then be made according to the accepted com¬
parisons of parsimony, communicability, coherence and refutability.
The following experiment was used because it conforms to these
demands. The experiment has been regarded as an operant learning
situation. Behaviourism, by definition, makes specific predictions
about the situation. Genetic epistemology makes specific predic¬
tions about the cognitive structure and function, particularly nega¬
tion, used by the infant in such situations. Logical representation
of the experiment is possible because logical representation of any




4. The infant was observed in a simple learning situation. The
basic cpmponents were a mobile, a photo-electric cell and the infant.
Mobile movement was related to photo-electric cell activation. The
photo-electric cell was placed so that activation was dependent on
some specific limb movement of the infant. The infant was given the
opportunity to determine that a connection existed between limb move¬
ment and mobile movement.
The independent variable was the causal connection between limb-
movement and mobile movement. The dependent variables were the
infant's pattern of limb-movement measured by number and type over
time and affective reaction. Observations were made for both initial
contingency conditions and changes from initial conditions.
The experimenter could infer whether the various subject reactions
(perseveration, adaptation, extinction, denial) were consistent or
inconsistent with the different interpretations.
4.J.. Conditioning This type of experiment can be described as
instrumental or free operant conditioning. There is no formal
difference between pigeons pecking for food and infants moving for
reward. In certain contingencies both creatures progressively
increase specified behaviour. It does not matter, at this stage,
that the nature of the reward for the infant is a mystery.
Thus, experimental results could be produced and analysed according
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to accepted behavioural methods.
"In choosing rate of responding as a basic datum and in
recording this conveniently in a cumulative curve, we make
important temporal aspects of behaviour visible." (Skinner
1956)
"We may define learning as a change in probability of
response, but we must also specify the conditions under which
it comes about. To do this we must survey the independent
variables of which probability of response is a function."
(Skinner 1950)
Some independent variables so far surveyed include motivation; dif¬
ficulty of response; environmental context and amount, delay and
schedules of reinforcement.
These surveys or inventories enter the descriptivist category previ¬
ously criticised. They deliver few insights into the nature of
learning and their deliberate specificity combined with an infinite
variety of possible context makes them endlessly uninteresting.
4.2. Contingency Analysis A more sophisticated analysis describes
the experiment in terms of contingency detection. J.S. Watson in a
series of papers points out the strengths of this approach. (Watson
1967, Watson 1972, Watson 1979, Watson 1984) Watson escapes from
the barren descriptivism of radical behaviourism by basing his
analysis on the infant's perception of control or contingency. This
analysis differs from that of conditioning in several respects.
1) The infant's structuring of experience (rather than its
behaviour) is seen as the focus of research.
2) The formal structure of contingencies, rather than the rate of
response, provides the investigative impetus.
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3) Non-behavioural contingencies are included within the analysis.
"Perfect contingency would exist if R were a necessary and
sufficient cause of S. Were that so, than every response
would produce a stimulus Now consider how this con¬
tingent relationship between R and S might be diminished.
There are two ways. One is by having the stimulus fail to
occur on some occasion when R has occurred. (Partial Rein¬
forcement or Intermittent reward). The other way of reducing
the contingency is by introducing the occurrence of the
stimulus independent of the occurrence of the response.
When this situation of reduced contingency is arranged, it is
termed a condition of noncontingent or response-independent
stimulation. Remarkably, these two ways of reducing the
contingency of a stimulus on a response have received
separate and very unequal attention in the experimental
literature. There has been extensive study of intermittent,
or partial, reinforcement particularly by Skinner and his
colleagues. However, the second way of reducing a con¬
tingency, involving response-independent occurrence of the
stimulus, has only recently received attention as an experi¬
mental variable in its own right." (Watson 1979)
4) Contingency Analysis assimilates a behaviouristic analysis;
behaviouristic analysis cannot easily accommodate itself to con¬
tingency terms and findings, for example the role of response-
independent reinforcement.
Watson's work demonstrates that important aspects of information,
previously ignored by investigators, are available to and are used by
the infant in similar situations to the above experiment.
Watson's analysis does display some enduring behaviouristic features.
Much of his work can be interpreted as research on different
schedules of reinforcement. The postulation of a new kind of rein¬
forcement (non-contingent) makes certain that a probabilistic
analysis must bifurcate. Thus the distinction between necessity pro¬
babilities, arrived at through analysis of non-contingent reinforce¬
ment, and sufficiency probabilities arrived at through analysis of
partial reinforcement.
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As for conditioning, the major preoccupation remains the temporal
structuring of response and reinforcement. Analysis proceeds
according to a temporal analysis of contingency relations.
Watson's analysis is clearly superior to an interpretation based on
traditional conditioning views. But it is obvious that Watson does
not succeed in telling the whole story. The approach needs to be
expanded and neutralized by the application of a formal analysis to
the phenomenon.
4.3. Formal Analysis Like contingency analysis, a formal approach
focuses on the infant's experience within the experiment. Unlike
contingency analysis, this approach is directed towards answering
some of the questions raised in Chapter 3 and is constrained by the
theoretical desiderata already outlined. The salient points of the
formal analysis of the phenomenon are:-
1) The structure of the infant's logical experience (rather than
behavioural experience) is the focus of investigation.
Representation is logical not behavioural, psychological or
mathematical. Non-logical terms (reinforcement; sufficiency;
necessity; success; non-contingent) are avoided.
2) Few presuppositions are made about the infant's logic.
Descriptions of 'perfect contingency' which can be reduced may
be relevant to adult or later forms of logic, but their use here
is unjustified. The infant may have a different idea of per¬
fection. Any such labeling is seen as premature.
3) Logical structure is atemporal. Time is here just one of the
many independent variables which may influence logical content.
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Temporal analysis of contingency relations is empirically
irrelevant to a formal approach.
4) Negation is clarified. Contingency analysis represents negation
as success or failure thus:-
"Apparently, if a subject, be he human infant or laboratory
rat, fails to perceive a contingency between his behaviour
and some recurrent stimulation, then his ability to perceive
a contingency in later situations will be greatly impaired
even if the stimulus is then perfectly contingent and seem¬
ingly obvious." (Watson 1979)
Formal analysis represents negation in terms of Truth and Falsehood,
Logic Acquisition and Logic Justification. Contingency analysis has
great difficulty in making the distinction between failure to per¬
ceive a contingency and success in perceiving a non-contingency.
Watson above means the latter, but states the former. Something has
been learnt because something successfully interferes with later
learning. This and further distinctions are made explicit by a for¬
mal approach because:-
5) An exhaustive and value-free analysis of logical relations is
possible:
Let proposition '1' be leg movement.
Let proposition 'm' be mobile movement
'T' means true and 'F' means false
Then: 1(T} means 'It is true that my leg moves'
1(F) means 'It is false that my leg moves'
m(T) means 'It is true that the mobile moves'
m(F) means 'It is false that the mobile moves'
Propositions '1' and 'm' with their associated truth values are
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elementary propositions. Their logical relationship can be defined
using a logical proposition 'r'.
Let 'r' specify the logical relationship between '1' and 'm'.
Thus; [1, m, r] means:- It is True that my leg moves
and the mobile moves
[1, m, not-r] means:- It is False that my leg moves and the mobile moves
[not-1,•not-m, r] means:- It is True that my leg does not move and the
mobile does not move.
etc.
These propositions define totally the formal structure of the
phenomenon. The only information available to the infant must come
from one or a combination of the defined logical relationships.
There is no other information. There is no superfluous information.
There is no preferred information. Formal analysis avoids the obvi¬
ous choice [1, m, r];
'It is true that my leg moves and the mobile moves^
to the mind numbing [not-1, not-m, not-r];
'It is false that my leg does not move and the mobile does not move.'
by giving them equal status in the investigation.





1. T T T
2. F T T
3. T F T
4. F F T
5. T T F
6. F T F
7. T F F
8. F F F
The formal approach is stronger than conditioning and contingency
analysis because both emerge from it. This can be demonstrated by
formal representation of the alternatives.
Conditioning starts from observed behaviour (1 in Table I). Non-
behaviour not-1 is excluded from the analysis. Investigations are
restricted to lines 1, 3, 5, 7 in Table I. Investigations are
further restricted by the denial of a negative connection between 1
and m. There is either a (S R) connection or there is not. Alter¬
natively stated; conditioning theory cannot differentiate between:
line 3 It is True that my leg moves and the mobile does not move,
and line 5 It is False that my leg moves and the mobile moves.
or
line 1 It is True that my leg moves and the mobile moves,
and line 7 It is False that my leg moves and the mobile does not move.
Conditioning Theory limits itself to lines 11 and 3. and designates
them 1003, reinforcement and Partial reinforcement respectively. All
conditioning research has been directed at these two logical rela-
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tions.
Contingency Analysis is explicitly interested in behaviour 1 and
non-behaviour not-1. No lines are excluded from Table 1 under pro¬
position '1'. Likewise both mobile movement m and non-movement
not-m are included in the analysis. No lines are excluded under
proposition 'm'.
Like conditioning, Contingency analysis does not accept that non-
connections can enter the analysis. Alternatively stated, Con¬
tingency Theory does not differentiate between:
line 3 and line 5
or
line 1, 6 and 7: -
line 1 It is True that my leg moves and the mobile moves,
and line 6 It is False that my leg does not move and the mobile moves,
and line 7 It is False that may leg moves and the mobile does not move.
Analysis is therefore limited to lines, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8. Further
restrictions result from a lack of concern for non-contingent not-1
non-reinforcement- not-m conditions. Lines 4 and 8 are excluded.
Contingency analysis limits itself to:-
1 m r
1. T T T 100% Reinforcement
2. F T T Non-Contingent Reinforcement
3. T F T Partial Reinforcement
There is no theoretical reason why the other contingencies (lines 4 -
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8) could not be included within the contingency analysis. An
exhaustive contingency theory is possible, but terminological diffi¬
culties quickly become apparent and make some sort of change essen¬
tial .
1 m r
4. F F T Non-Contingent Non-Reinforcement
5. T • T F Non (Contingent Reinforcement)
6. F T F Non (Non-Contingent Reinforcement)
7. T F F Non (Contingent or Partial Non-Reinforcement)
8. F F F Non (Non-Contingent Non-Reinforcement)
Practical difficulties remain, but the advantages of the formal
approach are apparent. Conditioning and Contingency Analysis
exclude or fail to make distinct sources of information which the
infant may use. Given that the epistemologist has no idea which
learning categories or logical structure is infantile, any exclusions
are premature. Results should be analysed with respect to behaviour
and non-behaviour, stimulus occurrence and non-occurrence. So far




5. The initial task at the logical level is clear. The epistemolo-
gist must deduce from subject reaction to experimental conditions,
the minimum number of logical relations (lines 1-8, table I) used by
the epistemic subject. This will define the limits of the logical
structure of the infant. Once the limits of the logic are defined,
the role of affirmation (T) and negation (F) at the various levels
(l,m and r) may be investigated.
At this point, there is no divergence from conditioning or con¬
tingency analysis. All that is proposed is that the infant brings to
the situation an ability to make some sort of connection between
activity and external world. Interpretative divergence occurs as
soon as the infant is presented as epistemic. As an active searcher
for knowledge, the infant will scan the logical connections at his
disposal and attempt to fill their propositional content. In this
analysis, the important learning limitations emanate from the logic,
not from what the world offers or motor development dictates.
5.J.. Experimental Conditions Connection between mobile and photo¬
electric (PE) cell was made via a pre-programmed BBC micro-computer.
The connection was defined by two number variables eg. (100,0).
The first variable defined the percentage time the mobile could be
moved by PE cell activation. The second variable defined the percen¬
tage time the mobile was moving and could be stopped by PE cell
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activation.
For example, in (100,0), the (100 - ) means the mobile moves for
r\
every PE cell activation, the (-,0) means the mobile is static.
Observed state with no PE cell activation: Mobile static.
Observed state with continuous PE cell activation: mobile moving.
In (0,100), the (0,-) means the mobile never moves for any PE cell
activation; the (-,100) means the mobile is moving and stops for
every PE cell activation.
Observed state with no PE cell activation: mobile moving.
Observed state with continuous PE cell activation: mobile static.
Each variable could be varied between 0 and 100. The first variable
(1st,2nd) was given precedence. Thus: In (100,10), the (100,-) means
the mobile moves for every PE cell activation; the (-,10) means the
mobile moves 10% of the total time given no PE cell activation.
Observed state with no PE cell activation: mobile moves 10% of the
time.
Observed state with continuous PE cell activation: mobile moving.
Analysis was restricted to the following conditions:








Initially, the infant was exposed to one of the above conditions.
Subsequently,a transfer from the initial condition to a different
condition was made.
There may be no group or statistical base-line for measurement of
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learning, but the transfer from one condition to another provided a
crucial individual base-line through which the formal content of the
knowledge constructed by the infant could be discovered. The experi¬
menter can never say only this much has been learnt at any point; the
transfer allows the experimenter to say that necessarily this much
must have been learnt otherwise reaction to transfer would not be
possible. Formally, reaction by change in rate or affect is much
more interesting than lack of positive reaction. Inferences made from
positive reactions have a higher status than inferences made from no
overt behavioural change.
.5.2- Experimental Environment A good enviroment for observing
behavioural change was determined by trial and error in a number of
pilot studies. The physical conditions were kept constant for all
subjects. The important features of the experimental enviroment
were:
1) Coloured back projection of mobile on screen
2) Distance from infants' eyes to screen - 30 inches
3) Placement of PE cell to ensure activation by full extension of
either leg
4) Time between activation and mobile movement 0.25 seconds
5) Mobile movement time per activation - 2 seconds
2-2- Subjects The subjects were 25 infants aged between 13 weeks
and 21 weeks. Subjects were restricted to two visits to facilitate
balancing of conditions and decrease interference due to variable
retention. Visits were arranged to be one week apart or as near to
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this as possible.
The 25 infants provided a total of 47 visits. 5 of these were ter¬
minated with no data obtained.
.5.4.. Analysis of Results Three experimenter decisions exert an
influence on the form of the learning curve. These directly effect
representation of the curve before any interpretations are made.
1) CRITERIA FOR EXCLUSION/TERMINATION
For the infant, participation in the experiment involved separation
from the parent, meeting strangers, a new and perhaps confusing
environment, an impoverished visual field consisting of an
illuminated mobile and being strapped in a strange chair in an
upright position which made sleep difficult.
In spite of these difficulties, most infants were willing to spend
some time visually examining the only salient feature of the enviro-
ment, the mobile.
The problem for the experimenter is to decide which subjects should
be excluded because of inattention to the mobile. Non-attention
could be manifested as distress, finger chewing, parent-seeking,
sleeping or, indeed, any behaviour such as chairfondling, bubble-
blowing, vocalisation, motor-activity or inactivity.
Alternatively, all of these manifestations could be a result of the
infant's interaction with mobile, with some infants habituating to
the relationship and other infants failing to discover causal rela¬
tionships and losing interest.
Experimental bias may be introduced by selective exclusion of sub¬
jects. Criteria for exclusion were therefore rigorous. Subjects were
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excluded from the analysis only if they were very distressed (eyes
shut, crying, very active), or had never looked at the screen
throughout the experiment.
5 out of the 47 visits were excluded from the analysis using these
criteria. Inclusion of infants more interested in chair-chewing or
finger-sucking may make group trends much harder to discern, but the
dangers of excluding subjects reacting to logical acquisitions are
avoided. Positive individual results, the elimination of experi¬
menter bias and minimal information loss compensate for submerged
group results. Any positive group differences are enhanced using
rigorous criteria.
2) CRITERIA FOR TRANSFER FROM CONDITION 1 to CONDITION 2
The theory behind the transfer is straight forward. Inferences can
be made about the content and structure of the logic used by the
infant by observing the infant's reaction to transfer in different
conditions.
Interpretations made from differences to projected curves are only
accurate if the projected curves are accurate. Thus the method is
systematic only if the transfer is introduced at the same point for
all subjects. Ideally, the experimenter should introduce the
transfer where learning is complete, but before habituation has
started. Practically, the experimenter has no way of knowing how
much or how little the subject has learnt. The transfer will be
introduced both before and after the learning curve reaches its max¬
imum, introducing corresponding inaccuracies to projected differ¬
ences .
Use of the transfer conditions appears to necessitate having the
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answers to the very questions posed. What is learnt? When is it
learnt? Thus the behaviourists use of extinction to investigate
learning entails the utilisation of conditions already categorised as
producing increments or decrements in learning. This may be a valid
technique after base-line studies have produced categorical results.
In the present situation, when there are no such results, this is
unjustifiable. The experimenter has no idea what constitutes optimal
or minimal learning conditions for the infants. In behavioristic
terms, we do not know the difference between conditioning and extinc¬
tion.
Behaviourists avoid the problem by denying it is a problem.
"There is nothing gained in setting an arbitrary point at
which conditioning shall be regarded as complete, for we are
not interested in a qualitative statement of the sort. It is
possible, moreover, that complete conditioning may only be
approached as a limit". (Skinner 1932)
Complete learning cannot exist because learning is a continuous and
orderly process which is represented quantitatively by rate of
response. The course of the process is the obtained curve and noth¬
ing else.
There is nothing wrong with the behaviourists stance if they admit to
a priori definitions of learning and extinction and deny that learn¬
ing can be a discontinuous process.
An epistemological analysis vitiates the problem by accepting that
learning may be discontinuous and denying that differences to the
projected curve provide the important interpretation.
The logical structure either has a propositional content, which may
be ambiguous, tautological or contradictory, or the logical structure
has received no logical content. If there is a content to the struc-
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ture, the transfer conditions will oppose a content-filled structure;
if there is no content the transfer conditions will oppose a
content-free structure. At this stage there is no way of telling
whether the subject is acquiring or justifying the content acquired.
The impossibility of practical temporal differentiation between
acquisition and justification becomes an irrelevant problem when the
projected curve is removed from the analysis. The transfer condition
is an • attempt to investigate the logic, not differences to a pro¬
jected curve. Transfer results can be interpreted with reference to
the logic already defined by analysis of initial condition results.
The problem of where to introduce the transfer becomes practical, not
theoretical. It does not matter when the transfer is introduced as
long as reaction to the transfer is observed. Thus, the transfer
condition was introduced differentially depending on the stamina of
the subjects. One initial condition (0,0) proved so aversive that an
early transfer was initiated at 120 seconds; for all other conditions
transfer was initiated between 210 and 780 seconds.
Reapplication of criteria for termination was necessary at the point
of transfer. Criteria for termination at transfer were the reverse
of the criteria for termination during the initial condition. Only
infants who were content and looking at the screen were included in
the transfer analysis. These criteria were an attempt to avoid
including reactions due to fatigue; hunger, loneliness etc amongst
genuine reactions to transfer conditions. 17 of the 42 visits which
provided data for initial conditions were excluded from analysis
using these criteria.
Once infants progressed to the transfer condition, termination was as




The theoretical problem with measures have already been detailed.
What to Measure?
The investigator wants to chart the logical content and structure of
the infants' knowledge systems relevant to the interaction between
leg-movement and mobile-movement. The adopted measures were leg-
movement and affective reaction.
Doubts about bias against propositional content of no-leg movement
and no-mobile movement are answered by pointing out that the impor¬
tant initial questions are not directed at propositional content, but
at logical structure. More practically the propositions chosen make
experimental conditions susceptible to logical representation. The
experimenter can cope with affirmation and negation of leg-movement
and mobile-movement at the various levels. Logical representation
and manipulation of negative propositions is more difficult.
Doubts about bias against other propositions can be answered by
pointing out that something must be measured; everything cannot be
measured. Measures of smiling; vocalisation; eye-blinks; unilateral
leg-movement; arm, head or bowel movements are all candidates for
measurement. It is enough that the propositions chosen suit the
infant. Infants can differentiate between a static mobile and a
mobile and leg-movement is in the repertoire of very young infants.
produce their practical counterparts.
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How to Measure?
The propositional content decided upon can be variously represented.
Rate of response was retained as a basic datum making a contrast with
traditional learning interpretations easier. Rate can be represented
as individual or as group data by:-
a) Rate of response by time
b) Rate of response by percentage time
c) Percentage rate of response by time
d) Percentage rate of response by percentage time
Each representation has advantages and disadvantages. The more obvi¬
ous are.--
Group results may submerge interesting individual data.
Interesting trends may not be discernible in individual results.
Percentage rates may hide interesting differences in rate between
conditions.
Percentage time may hide interesting differences in time between con¬
ditions .
Measurement of time necessitates arbitrary choice of time slots, too
small and results are incomprehensible, too large and information is
lost.
Measurement by rate may create bias either for or against low or high
rates.
Because of these problems, results are represented using all of these
measures. The time slots were by the minute, by centile time and by
split time (50/50) in condition. Reasons for not attempting to
account for any measures are presented where necessary. For example,
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where time in conditions is very divergent, as between (0,0) and
(100,0), rate by centile time is of dubious value. Conversely, a
good guide to change in response within conditions is taken to be
percentage mean rate by split times.
Consistency between different measures is noted.
As far as possible, the accepted behavioural maximum
"When one asks which of the possible measures is best, it
turns out that the answer is different for different situa¬
tions, and that it depends in part upon practical considera¬
tions". (Kimble 1961)
...is ignored. Within the limits of the propositions chosen an
attempt is made to account for all the above measures.
Theory and Evidence
The most persistent problem for the theorist is one of attachment.
How can specific attachment of measures to theory be justified? The
experiment appears to be straightforward; a neutral analysis produces
a different conclusion.
The behavioural theorist may take a persistent increment in leg move¬
ment to be a sign of acquisition of a learned response.
The neutral theorist can point out that it is as reasonable to take a
persistent increment in leg movement as a sign of non-justification
of the logical relationship between activity and mobile-movement.
Why should the infant who has acquired the relationship justify it
persistently? Sporadic justification is just as likely. Similarly
an infant who acquires the relationship very quickly may not display
any increment in activity. This does not make the acquisition any
less real.
The theorist can only be wary of a blinkered analysis of results. In
the present case, whatever measures are adopted, results must be
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examined for any change, not necessarily for increment. Any change
is potentially revealing.
The use of affective reaction as a concurrent measurement delivers
further justification to any interpretation. The assumption held
throughout the analysis is that affective reaction will be positive
(smiling, cooing gurgling, maintenance of interest) if informative
content or structure is expanded; negative (frowning, crying, rage,
loss of interest) if information loss or structural destruction




Results have been variously presented. (Appendices I to VI) Measures
of speed, rigour, and persistence are available. Which should be
taken as the most accurate reflection of learning? Even before
interpretations from data are attempted, there are doubts about which
data should be interpreted. One can sympathise with the behaviour¬
ist who believes solutions lie in the collection of more data.
The temptation in the above experiment is to go on working through
different conditions using different or greater numbers of subjects.
From the job-creation perspective, the experiment is ideal. The
combinations and permutations of conditions; (0,100, 100/0)
(100,0, 0,100); combined with the classic psychological categories
of age, sex, social class and handicap, guarantee that the single-
minded application of the entire resources of every psychology
department would fail to complete the task. A single experiment,
deliberately restricted to two propositions, provides the source for
an infinite number of observations.
The error, instigating this misapplication of resources, has already
been explicated. The data has no priority even if the chapter head-
ing tends to mislead. Interpretations should not be attempted from
data. Missing or accidental observations make such attempts use¬
less. Interpretations should be addressed to data. Data determines
which of the many interpretations provides the best answers, but the
initial construction of the interpretations remains entirely unaf-
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fected by any possible data. The process of theory-construction in
science is a mystery. Data is relevant to the process of theory
validation not theory construction. The psychologists failure to
differentiate between construction and validation is realised in the
myth that data causes theory and subsequent complaints when no theory
appears. There is no magical or mechanical concoction for theory
building, nor do interpretations change because of data. Data
specifies the scope of the theory, not the content of the theory.
Data may direct the theoretical content to different targets.
The results from this experiment will be interpreted according to
this process of progressive specification. At all stages of the
analysis the infant will be regarded as epistemic. The early
hypotheses will be extremely crude, where relevant, alternative
interpretations will be presented. The minimum formal content and
structure necessary for each interpretation will be progressively
outlined.
6.J.. The Infant Changes the Specified Behaviour in the Initial Con¬
dition of the Experimental Situation. This is the most general
hypothesis. Individual and Group results validate this interpreta¬
tion. 34 of the 42 infant visits display an increase in rate; 7 of
the 42 infant visits display a maintenance in rate, only 1 of the 42
infant visits show a decrease in rate over the condition. (A. 111.(1
to 7), c), d)). Diagrams 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 show this pro¬
gressive change in the rate of leg movement. The change is incremen¬
tal . Thus:
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l-l-l. The Infant Progressively Increases the Specified Behaviour in
the Initial Condition of the Experimental Situation. At this stage
of the analysis, even before any attempts are made to answer why the
infant acts, an extensive formal structure must be attributed to the
epistemic infant to account for the capability for action.
There is something about the experimental situation that is identi¬
fied by infants and is associated with increases in the specified
behaviour. No systematic change in behaviour can occur unless the
infant possesses the ability to identify and affirm something. The
infant must possess a propositional capability. There are things.
Change in specified behaviour can not be maintained unless the infant
possesses the ability,to identify the thing propounded as continuing
over time. The infant must possess a notion of permanence. There
are enduring things.
Further, systematic change can not be consistently produced unless
the infant possesses a notion of equality. The infant identifies
something about the situation as being equal to another something in
another situation. The infant must possess a notion of identity.
There are equal things.
Finally, the observed change in the specified behaviour can never
start or stop unless the infant possesses the ability to recognise
things as being NOT other things. The infants reaction to the
breast does not generalise to the mobile and vice-versa. The infant
must possess a notion of negation. There are different things.
Propositional content involving p, q and r; permanence; identity
(If p then p) and negation not-p are the cornerstones of formal
logic. The results of the experiment indicate that the 13 to 20 week
old infant possesses these powerful logical concepts. Indeed, any
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creature which changes its behaviour in an operant situation must
also possess these concepts. Logical divergence between such
creatures and between adult and infant lies in the application of
these basic notions, not as popular presuppositions exhort, in their
presence or absence. It is curious that in an effort to separate
man from the animals, the psychologist is unwilling to ascribe any
capability to the infant. it is only for the adult that the world
of the infant is a booming, buzzing confusion or simple, fixed, ele¬
mentary, undifferentiated and chaotic. Investigations which start
from this stance are not only pejorative, but useless, precisely
because the established concepts of logic (objects, permanence, iden¬
tity and negation) are manifestly not beyond the cognitive grasp of
the young infant. The only profitable investigative stance is to
interrogate the infant regarding the application of these established
concepts.
6.2. A Causal Connection Between Foot Movement and Mobile Movement
is the Permanent Object Identified by the Infant and Associated with
an Increase in the Specified Behaviour in the Initial Condition of
the Experimental Situation
"In the last 20 years following Papousek's classic work (PA-
POUSEK 1959), laboratory studies of infant learning have pro¬
vided ample evidence that the human infant is capable of per¬
ceiving and engaging instrumental contingencies very possibly
from birth, but surely by the end of the second month of
life." (Watson 1984)
That the infant in the experimental situation is engaged in some sort
of contingency detection is not in dispute if 6.1 is accepted. What
is in dispute, is the nature of the contingencies involved.
Analysis, so far, indicates that the specified behaviour has
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increased; this contingency is not a matter for debate.
6.2 demands that the thing associated with the increase be specified
as the causal connection between foot and mobile. But the observed
increase could be associated with any changing feature of the situa¬
tion, either internal (fatigue, motivation, hunger, fear, elation,
restlessness) or external (light, temperature, noise, movement, hard¬
ness of the chair). It appears that the strongest statement is res¬
tricted to the postulation of a causal connection between leg-
movement 1 and an unknown proposition p. Any specification of p
seems to be premature. Whatever p is posited, alternative interpre¬
tations are available.
The scientist should not be surprised at the availability of alterna¬
tives. The above argument stops the analysis only if rational choice
between interpretations is rejected. There are three sources of evi¬
dence supportive of 6.2.
Naive Observation
Casual observation of the infant in the experimental situation sup¬
ports the hypothesis that the infant is interested in the mobile.
Infants appeared content when the mobile was present, distressed when
it was not. Infants' gaze was directed at the screen for long
periods. Initial restlessness and random activity in many cases
developed into a happy, observant stance and specific activity.
These characteristic signs combined with an absence of the charac¬
teristic signs of hunger, fear and fatigue make other interpretations
unlikely.
Reaction to Different Initial Causal Connections
All aspects of the situation were kept constant for all subjects.
The independent variable, the causal connection between leg-movement
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and mobile movement, is the only source of different reactions.
Two initial conditions (0,0) and (0,10) proved very aversive to sub¬
jects (see A. IV.3 and A.IV.4.) Six out of the eight subjects
became very distressed, and the other two subjects produced a very
low rate of response.
Different conditions elicited very different rates and patterns of
behaviour. (Diagrams 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13)
It is impossible to ascribe these observed differences in reaction to
anything but the nature of the causal condition. Infants' reactions
to these different conditions could only be elicited if the focus of
attention was indeed the mobile.
Reaction to Different Transfer Conditions
The differences in reaction to various transfer conditions provides
the strongest evidence that the other contingency involved in the
learning situation is the mobile.
Reaction to initiation of transfer conditions (0,0) and (0,90) was
affectively spectacular, (see A.IV. 1.3; 2.1 and 7.1) Five out of
the seven subjects displayed violent antipathy to initiation of these
transfer conditions.
Other transfer conditions produced consistent reactions in both
affect and changes in rate, (see A.IV. 2.2; 6.1 and 2.3)
These very different reactions to different transfer conditions can
either be attributed to the different causal connections or to
accidental influences.
Analysis, so far, has paralleled more conventional representations of
the infant's interaction with the world; the infant responds with
foot movement to the stimulus of the mobile. 6.1 and 6.2 have not
been presented in this abbreviated form for two reasons.
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The mutually supportive myths of infantile incompetence and interven¬
ing variables have been destroyed. The infant has a logical com¬
petence and is capable of directing it. Intervening variables do
not make a formal analysis impossible either for the infant or the
scientist.
Secondly, an abbreviated analysis which takes rate as the basic datum
loses vital evidence. The infant's response is not limited to
changes in rate. Vigorous and definitive responses to different
causal connections were observed which were not reflected in analysis
of rate. An epistemic analysis does not remove hunger, restlessness,
depression, ecstasy and tantrum from the analysis; it treats them as
different responses to different conditions. It is no accident that
the infant is disinterested and progressively restless in some condi¬
tions, ecstatic or antipathetic in others. Thus as a corollary to
6.2:
£.2.J.. The Infant Responds Differently to Different Causal Connec¬
tions These different responses will provide clues as to how the
infant structures its experience. Again, the temptation for the
experimenter is to attempt to elicit different responses in different
conditions. But the behaviour is not of direct interest, the struc¬
ture remains the investigative focus.
Accepting 6.1 and 6.2 means accepting that the infant is an epistemic
agent who acquires and justifies knowledge. This process of acquisi¬





The infant and the adult are formally equivalent in several respects.
They show an ability to identify and affirm propositional content and
an ability to affirm and negate relationships between propositions.
There are a limited number of ways the propositions involved can be
related. These have already been listed in Table I.
Table I
1 m r
1. T T T
2. F T T
3. T F T
4. F F T
5. T T F
6. F T F
7. T F F
8. F F F
Formal or standard or adult logic has names for 16 causal relation¬
ships. These relationships are defined by analysis of only four out
of the eight lines listed in Table I. The subset of named relation¬
ships is obtained by restricting the possible truth values in (r) at
any specific truth-value in 1 and m to either TRUE or FALSE, but not
both. Thus if Line 1) is affirmed, Line 5) is negated. If Line 7)
is affirmed, Line 3) is negated. This restriction is a necessary
consequence of allowing no contradictions to exist at the level of
the causal relationship r. The causal relationships are always res¬
tricted to four lines and defined by the truth values under (r).
50










Lines 1 2 3 4
1. T T T T TAUTOLOGY
2. F T T T Not both 1 and m
3. T F T T If m then 1
4. T T F T If 1 then m
5. T T T F 1 or m
6. F F T T not m
7. F T F T not 1
8. . F T T F 1 or m, but not both
9. T F F T If 1 then m and if m then 1
10. T F T F 1
11. T T F F m
12. F F F T neither 1 nor m
13. F F T F 1 and not m
14. F T F F m and not 1
15. T F F F 1 and m
16. F F F F CONTRADICTION
Previous investigations have concentrated on one or two parts of
these causal relationships (See Chapter 4) and have tended to ignore
the others. The very words used to describe the relationships tend
to give some a priority over others. Thus, 'strict implication' is
often ascribed more 'value' than 'neither 1 nor m'. Formally all
the relationships from 1. to 16. in Table II are equivalent and the
infants acquisitive capability with regard to them is an empirical
matter. They are all causal relationships.
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Unfortunately, there is a strong bias inherent in Table II. There
is no evidence that the infant shares the adult notions of contradic¬
tion and negation. Indeed, given the spectacular failure of adult
investigations into the mind of the infant there is every reason to
suppose that the infant's notion of contradiction and negation are
very different from the adult's.
The unbias investigator can do nothing else but assume that the
infant is capable of asserting and affirming Lines 1) to 8) in Table
I. This leads the analysis to the uncomfortable conclusion that the
adult investigator will have no names for the causal relationships
used by the infant. Even more disturbing, is the speculation that
the causal relationships discovered may be beyond the cognitive grasp
of the investigator. The restricted logic of the adult being unable
to assimilate the more general logic of the infant.
Apart from the appeal for impartiality, there are formal grounds for
giving up the standard notions of causal relationships in the case of
the infant. Strong logic can never emerge from weak. Adult logic
uses all eight lines from Table I, but only four at any time, to
define causal relationships. Simultaneous denial of spontaneous
creation and assertion of logical differences between adult and
infant delivers a direction to the differences. At some stage in the
process of acquiring or justifying knowledge the infant can utilise
the entire contents of Table I to define causal relationships between
propositions.
Secondly, if the causal relationship is treated like any other propo¬
sition, like (1) or (m) for example, there is no obvious reason why
it can not be held to be both TRUE and FALSE.
The infant can cope with contradiction at the level of the behaviour:
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1 m r
1} T T T
2) F T T
and at the level of the stimulus:
1 m r
1) T T T
3) T F T
so why not at the level of the causal relationship:
1 m r
1) T T T
5) T T F
Somehow, the logician has placed the relationship in a privileged
propositional position. Truth and Falsehood in r are not the same
as Truth and Falsehood in 1 and m. Implicit in the rejection of
contradiction at the level of r is the distinction between elementary
propositions and logical propositions. This distinction may be an
analytic artifact unused by the infant. Assuredly, for the infant,
there are things. It remains to be proved whether, for the infant,
there are logical things and other things. Rather than accuse the
infant of a similar propositional bias, the impartial investigator
must assume that the infant regards the causal relationship like any
other proposition.
The experimenter may have no vocabulary for the causal relationships
used by the infant and may have great difficult in acquiring such
relationships. Fortunately, any relationships are easily defined by
the particular configuration of propositional relationships affirmed
and their various truth values.
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Using only Table I the analysis can progress from a representation of
the formal relationships investigated by conditioning theory:
From Table I
Line 1) T T T 100% Reinforcement
Line 3) T F T Partial Reinforcement
to a representation of the focus of contingency detection:
From Table I
1 m r
Line 1) T T T 100% Reinforcement
Line 2) F T T Non-Contingent Reinforcement
Line 3) T F T Partial Reinforcement
to a formal analysis of standard logic:
From Table I
(r)
1 m 1)- 1G) (From Tabl<
Line 1) T T T F
Line 2) F T T F
Line 3} T F T F
Line 4) F F T F
to the object of inquiry, the epistemic infant.
The infants utilisation of causal relationships can be defined using
any or all of the lines from Table I.




Line 1) T T T
Line 2) F T T Tautology
Line 3) T F T Not both 1 and m
Line 4) F F T
Line 5) T T F
although virtually incomprehensible could be expressed in words as a
combination of Tautology and Not both 1 and m.
If
Line 6) F T F
is added, the following standard logic descriptions are involved in
the definition.
From Table II
Line 1 T T T T Tautology
Line 2) F T T T Not both 1 and m
Line 3) T F T T If m then 1
Line 6) F F T T Not m
and the words lose all value.
The analysis appears to have generates a paradox. Justification of
the logical relationships used by the infant can be done by the adult
by defining the relationships as above. But the adult is incapable
of acquiring the relationships defined, the words collapse under the
weight of apparent contradictions. Justification appears to precede
acquisition.
A paradox is generated only if the adult denies his own infancy.
The epistemic infant becomes the epistemic adult, acquisition pre¬
cedes justification. The apparent gap in this case provides more
evidence that there is a reversible symmetry between acquisition and
justification. Late acquisitions are justified early, early acquisi-
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tions are justified late. The acquisitions in question, causal rela¬
tionships between things, are very early and we should not perhaps be
surprised that we have, for practical purposes, forgotten them just
as we are learning that their justification is a possibility.
Interestingly, attempts to justify the epistemologically prior ques¬
tion about the existence of things runs into similar, but greater
difficulties. Heidegger's entire output can only be understood as an
attempt to justify the earliest acquisition, that of being itself.
Heidegger was aware that his question and subsequent analysis; "Why
are there things rather than nothing?" can only be interpreted at the
very end of the justificatory process.
"But this question may be asked expressly, or, unrecognised
as a question, it may merely pass through our lives like a
brief gust of wind, it may press hard upon us or, under one
pretext or another, we may thrust it away from us and silence
it. In any case, it is never the question that we ask first
in point of time."
"But it is the first question in another sense - in regard to
rank. This may be clarified in three ways. The question
"Why are there things rather than nothing?" is first in rank
for us, first because it is the most far reaching, second be¬
cause it is the deepest and finally because it is the most
fundamental of all questions." (Heidegger 1953)
The first acquisition for the majority will never be justified and
Heidegger proves his case.
This metaphysical interlude has provided the analysis with a hierar¬
chy of questions.
Question 1 Why are there things?
Question 2 What things are involved here?
Question 3 Why are there relationships between things?
Question 4 What relationship between things are involved here?
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Question 1 is best left with Heidegger. Questions 2, 3 and 4 can now
be answered with regard to the infants acquisitions.
The things involved here are propositions. The particular proposi¬
tions involved are leg-movement 1 and mobile-movement m. The infant
possesses the ability to affirm (T) or negate (F) these propositions.
Question 3 can be answered on various levels. Relationships exist
between things because the existence of things necessitates a rela¬
tionship between something and something else or nothing. Relation¬
ships exist because development demands them. Relationships exist
because we observe them. None of which are satisfactory answers.
It is, perhaps, more likely that "Why" questions about acquisitions
are inappropriate.
A definitive answer to question'4 is available. The relationships
between propositions are defined by the truth values expressed in
Table I.
Summary
The infant's acquisition of causal relationships is very different
from the adult's, differences are directional, for the infant there
are no restrictions on the acquisition of causal relationships.
The infant posits. 1 and m, projects a relationship and inserts the
propositions into the logical structure. All lines in Table I
receive a propositional content. The infant does not abandon adult
notions of contradictios, tautology or paradox because it has never
restricted itself by acquiring them.
Future acquisitions become impenetrable to the experimenter immedi¬
ately initial acquisitions are diminished.
"But what is great can only begin great. Its beginning is
in fact the greatest thing of all. A small beginning be¬
longs only to the small, whose dubious greatness it is to di-
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rainish all things; small are the beginnings of decay, though
it may later become great in the sense of the enormity of to¬




To complete the epistemic process, the infant must attempt to justify
the logical content and structure acquired. Justification can only
be done by observation. The different conditions provide the infant
with the opportunity to observe and justify different relationships.
The experimenter, in turn, can attempt to map the logical content and
structure acquired by interpretation of the infant's observed
behaviour onto the logical content and structure justified by the
formal attributes of the different conditions involved. The end
point of the analysis is the infant's justification.
£M. The following interpretations were made to account for the
observed behaviour of the infant in the different conditions.
.8.1.J.. The infant acquires a propositional content for (r) in all
conditions.
8.1.2. The infant acquires a propositional content for (1) and (m)
in Conditions (100,0); (100,10); (0,10); (0,50); (0,90); and
(0,100).
The infant does not acquire a propositional content for (1) and (m)
in Condition (0,0).
.8.1. 3. The propositional content acquired in 8.1.1 is justified in
conditions (100,0); (100,10) and (0,100).
Justification in incomplete in conditions (0,0); (0,10); (0,50);
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and (0,90).
8.1.4. The epistemic process is completed in conditions (100,0);
(100,10) and (0,100). Completion of the process leads to adoption of
a particular nexus of relationships. This relationship constitutes
knowledge.
.8.1.5.. The knowledge thus constructed is different for each condi¬
tion. In each case the infant learns something different.
8.1.6. Knowledge thus constructed is resistant to change, but open
to negation.
.8.2. The formal attributes of the different conditions depend on the
stance of the observer. An initial analysis can be attempted which
treats the infant as an interested observer testing hypotheses on the
basis of the observed behaviour of the mobile.
This analysis assumes that the infant treats the leg movement as the
independent variable and the mobile movement as the dependent vari¬
able. In this analysis, the causal agent is the infant; given this
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Condition (100,0) is defined by Lines 1, 4, 6 and 7.
Condition (100,10) is defined by Lines 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8.
Conditions (0,10); (0,50); (0,90) are defined by Lines 2, 3, 4, 5 6
and 8.
Conditions (0,0) is defined by Lines, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Condition (0,100) is defined by Lines 2, 3, 5 and 8.
jS.,3. A mapping of 8.1 onto 8.2 produces the following interpreta¬
tions .
8.3.J.. The infant attempts to justify the acquired knowledge by
analysis of all relationships. The three conditions (100,0);
(100,10) and (0,100) are justified using different groups of rela¬
tionships which span the entire contents of Table I.
The four conditions unjustified span six out of the eight lines in
Table I.
Therefore it is the particular nexus of lines observed and not any
line which leads to justification of a relationship between 1 and m.
When logical content and structure is acquired and justified, the
infant acts as a causal agent.
When logical content and structure is acquired but not justified the
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infant does not act as a causal agent, rather as an interested
observer.
When logical content and structure is neither acquired nor justified
the infant acts neither as a causal agent nor as an interested
observer.
8.-3.2. Simpler interpretations are available. The complexity of
the infant's initial acquisitions need not be reflected in justifica¬
tion. Indeed, acceptance of a reversible symmetry between processes
implies that if acquisition goes from complex, contradictory and
unspeakable to simple, two-valued and communicable, then justifica¬
tion reverses the course. Thus the behaviourist may be able to save
his approach by accepting the proof that a purely behavioural stance
is too restricted to account for acquisitions. Subsequent to this
acceptance the behaviourist can assert that since we have proved we
cannot really speak about acquisitions, we must pass over them in
silence and enter the behavioural domain - justification.
This claim is intuitively attractive and deserves analysis.
A behavioural interpretation states that Lines 1. and 3. are the only
relationships used by the infant to justify acquired knowledge. The
other relationships may be observed, but are irrelevant to the learn¬
ing process.
This interpretation accounts for several of the positive findings.
Conditions (0,0), (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90) all lack Line 1.. The
infant will fail to learn because the crucial component of the learn¬
ing process is absent. These conditions reflect this failure in the
infants behaviour; progressive restlessness, discontent and not one
observed positive reaction to transfer.
Conditions (100,0) and (100,10) are identical with respect to Lines
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1. and 3. The crucial component (Line 1) is present and learning
occurs; affective reaction to these conditions and to transfer from
these conditions is similar. The violent aversive reaction to
transfer to (0,0) can be interpreted as instantaneous extinction.
Further evidence that these conditions are similar is the lack of
reaction to transfer from (100,10) and (100,0).
The observed learning in (0,100) and positive reaction to transfer
from (100,0) to (0,100) appears to be a problem. Line 1 is absent
in condition (0,100). this problem is solved by noting that rein-
forcers are not fixed. If a new reinforcer (mobile-stops) is sub¬
stituted for the old (mobile-moves), condition (0,100) possesses Line
1. Alternatively, the reinforcer can be regarded as the change in
state, not the state per se, rendering condition (0,100) and (100,0)
identical. This simplest of all interpretations appears to account
for much of the observed evidence. Unfortunately, this interpreta¬
tion is severely embarrassed by other evidence.
Conditions (0,0), (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90) did indeed produce simi¬
larities in the infant's behaviour. There were also distinctive
differences in behaviour between these conditions. The most distinc¬
tive difference being between (0,0) and the others. Condition (0,0)
produced instant aversion in both initial and transfer conditions.
Aversion was much more progressive in the initial conditions of
(0,10), (0,50) and (0.90). The justification for these observed
differences cannot come from differences in Lines 1. and 3.. The
behavioural interpretation cannot account for these observations and
must classify them as incidental to the learning process.
Likewise, there are positive differences between behaviour in (100,0)
and (100,10). Affective reaction is similar, but (100.10) produces
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a much higher rate than (100,0). Most interesting was the defini¬
tive positive reaction to transfer from (100,0) to (100,10) compared
to the neutral reaction to transfer from (100,10) to (100,0). Again
(100,0) differs from (100,10) only in Lines 2. and 8. and the
behavioural account must classify these observations as accidental.
The reformulation of (0,100) by changing the reinforcer or the asser¬
tion of a shared reinforcer with (100,0) creates several formal prob¬
lems.
If a new reinforcer (mobile-stops) is substituted for the old
(mobile-moves) some ad hoc mechanism must stop this substitution in
conditions (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90). If substitution takes place
in these conditions then the formal attributes become identical to
(100,10) and learning should occur; since there is no obvious man¬
ifestation of learning, there can have been no such substitution.
Similarly, if (0,100) and (100,0) share reinforcers (change in
state), then (100,10) and (0,90) share the same reinforcer even with
respect to rate of reinforcement. There are undeniable differences
between behaviour in (100,10) and behaviour in (0,90).
A behavioural interpretation which relies only on Lines 1. and 3.
cannot give a systematic account of these phenomena.
A more sophisticated behavioural approach could be attempted using
contingency detection terms. Contingency detection utilises Lines
1., 2. and 3. and successfully differentiates between (100,0) and
(100,10); (0,0) and ((0,10), (0,50), (0,90)). It fails to dif¬
ferentiate between; (0,100) and ((0,10), (0,50), and (0,905). Con¬
tingency detection theory decreases, but does not eliminate the
amount of incidental phenomena.
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8.4. The epistemic interpretation appears superior with respect to
internal consistency, formal coherence and assimilation of phenomena.
The formal differentiation inherent in the interpretation appears to
reflect the distinctive behavioural categories observed.
The interpretation, apparently successful, is implicitly paradoxical
and further specification is necessary. The paradox becomes
apparent by noting that the interpretation accounts for the most dis¬
tinctive behavioural difference between conditions, (contentment of
the infant in (100,0), (100,10) and (0,100) and discontentment in
(0,0), (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90) by claiming that the epistemic pro¬
cess in the unhappy conditions is incomplete. The infant objects
because of boredom or frustration. This seems to be a reasonable
explanation until we note that incomplete justification implies that
no knowledge has been constructed. The analysis appears to have
worked itself back to the problem raised in Chapter 4; if no
knowledge has been gained, if the subject has remained static with
regard to knowledge of relationships, then the subject's ability to
perceive a contingency in later situations should not be greatly
impaired. Yet the above results indicate impairment in the relevant
conditions. Secondly, if justification is incomplete and no
knowledge has been constructed in conditions (0,0), (0,10), (0,50)
and (0,90) the subject has no way of differentiating between these
conditions. Yet (0,0) produces a distinctive behavioural category.
The interpretation, successfully isolates (0,0) on the formal level
(8.2), but not on an epistemic level (8.3).
The epistemic interpretation must solve this problem. The interpre¬
tation must explain the distinctive behavioural differences between
conditions and at the same time account for any subsequent impairment
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to learning after exposure to 'non-learning' conditions. These two
tasks are apparently irreconcilable at the behavioural level and no
behavioural analysis offers a systematic solution.
Since there is no such thing as contradictory facts or behaviour, the
solution must be brought about at the theoretical level. The problem
requires re-examination before a decision can be made as to what part
of the theory requires specification.
8.5.
FACT The epistemic process consists of acquisition and justification.
FACT Completion of the epistemic process leads to adoption of a par¬
ticular nexus of relationships.
FACT This relationship constitutes knowledge.
FACT Something has been learnt in condition (0,0), (0,10), (0,50) and
(0,90). Something interferes with later learning.
FACT Something has been learnt in conditions (0,0), (0,10), (0,50)
and (0,90). Something interferes with earlier learning.
FACT The something that has been learnt is different in (0,0) from
the something that has been learnt in (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90).
These facts are not irreconcilable:
FACT In condition (100,0), (0,100) and (100,10) the infant has learnt
something different from the something that is learnt in conditions
(0,0), (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90).
AND
The interpretation of this difference is 8.1.3. The process of
acquisition and justification is incomplete in conditions (0,0),
(0,10), (0,50) and (0,90).
Unlike the infant, the epistemologist cannot allow the epistemic pro¬
cess to be simultaneously complete and incomplete. The only
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solution to the problem is to posit two different processes. One is
complete. One is incomplete.
The immediate reaction to this bifurcation is to point out that
knowledge is either possessed or not possessed. It can only be held
and not held if the individual is disintegrating.
From the psychologist's causal viewpoint, this may be so, but the
infant is not a psychologist and from a teleological viewpoint
knowledge can be constructed on as many levels as there are purposes.
An ethologist would argue that the image so far presented of the
infant as a neutral knowledge acquirer is hopelessly impoverished.
Nothing about the infant is neutral. The infant is a demanding,
purposeful agent determined to discover and use his capabilities in
manipulation of all relationships whether with objects or organisms.
The infant does not blandly inquire after knowledge, he seeks it out
as if his life depends on it.
The emotive and ethological arguments against the concept of neutral
one- dimensional knowledge are strong, but the formal arguments are
overwhelming. The object of inquiry was the logical content, struc¬
ture and processes of the infant. There are very many different log¬
ics. Each has its distinctive features. Some logics will share
many features. Some logics will share few features. There are
logics relevant to being, learning, causation, language, self, fear,
freedom, hunger and many others. The above analysis attempts to
explicate fragments from at least three different logics; being,
learning and causation. The analysis would fail if it did not
specify the different logics involved.
The apparent paradox is solved. The terms causal and logical, up to
now, have been interchangeable. We must now be more careful with
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the terminology. There are at least two logics involved; the Logic
of Learning (Logic) and the Logic of Causation.
In 8.1 the logic of causation was the object of inquiry, but 8.2
introduced distinctions relevant to the logic of learning. In con¬
dition (0,0), (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90) the process of acquisition
and justification was completed with regard to the logic of learning,
but not completed with regard to the logic of causation.
This solution to the 'non-learning' paradox and specification of the
epistemic interpretation came about because of theoretical specifica¬
tion. It can now be seen that justification must always have an
object not just in the sense of an acquisition to be examined. Jus¬
tification also has a purpose. The potential of the knowledge about
to be constructed lies not merely in the fact of its existence.
Potential knowledge also has a direction. All of the infant's
behaviour can be interpreted as a reaction to different projections
and expectations.
Like the epistemic infant, this analysis does not disintegrate with
the introduction of these different logics. Their introduction
means that the relationships between them can be examined.
J5.J5. The epistemic processes under investigation are closely
related. The logic of being, the process whereby the infant comes to
attribute existence to objects, remains in the metaphysical domain.
This logic cannot therefore be ignored. An inquiry which does not
treat this logic as epistemologically prior to every other logic is
unsound. The logic of being must be affirmed at every stage of the
analysis.
The logic of learning, the process whereby the infant comes to attri¬
bute relationships to objects, is in the psychological domain.
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Acquisition and justification relevant to this process have already
been detailed. If the logic of being is epistemologically first in
order of rank, then the logic of learning is second. No other logic
can receive a content or structure until being and relationships are
discovered. Chapter 7 shows why the infant must have at its dispo¬
sal the contents of Table I. 8.2 shows how the infant justifies
these acquisitions by observation. The description of the infant as
a causal agent must be retracted; logical must be substituted for
causal.
The logic of causation, the process whereby the infant comes to
attribute personal efficacy to self, is also in the psychological
domain. The ontogenetic relationships between personal efficacy,
other efficacy and egoity are complex. Although resolution of the
debate may not be achieved by empirical means, this analysis provides
the means for a reformulation. The logic of egoity can be seen as a
subset of the logic of being. Egoity emerges with the acquisition
and justification of a particular enduring existent.
The logic of other efficacy can be defined as identical to the logic
of learning. The infant as observer of an infant in the experimental
situation could attribute other efficacy to either the mobile or the
observed infant. Thus other efficacy emerges before, or at least
with, personal efficacy. The logic of personal efficacy cannot be
constructed without the logic of learning. The infant must be able
to analyse situations and categorise them as causal or not-causal,
but they are all learning situations. In one category, the infant
discovers personal efficacy. The other category allows learning;
the infant learns that personal efficacy does not apply; many
infants object to this observed lack of command and control.
69
Thus there is only one 1, the efficacious self, in the logic of cau¬
sation. There are myriad l's in the logic of learning. Apart from
this difference and one other, the logics are identical. The
acquisitions necessary for their construction are the same. The
infant requires the contents of Table I to construct a logic of cau¬
sation. It is also apparent that the relationships defined by the
logic of causation as causal are a subset of the relationships
defined by the logic of learning. All causal relationships have
been learnt; not all learnt relationships are causal.
Again, the temptation is to attempt an inventory of causal relation¬
ships. the analysis has only investigated seven learning relation¬
ships and three causal relationships. No doubt there are many more
in both categories. Any findings would be original, but not confir¬
matory because no attempt has been made to answer the interesting
question. Why are relationships justified? Why are relationships
defined as causal or non-causal? A listing of relationships is not a
serious attempt to answer this interesting question. From the
epistemological point of view it is a displacement activity, nothing
more than a description of the output of the different logics.
An analysis of the differences between the logics is the only way
into the question. There is a minor difference in the propositional
content allowed in 1), but this does not explain why some logical
relationships are causal and some are not. The logic of causation
obviously possesses a criterion for excluding logical relationships..
Thus the crucial difference between the two logics lies at the level
of negation. Negation in the logic of learning is different from
negation in the logic of causation. This difference demands specif¬
ication, without which, the analysis is incomplete. The infant's
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justification of the acquisitions relevant to the logic of causation




9.J.. For every affirmation, there is, presumably at least one nega¬
tion. Psychologists make extensive use of these many forms of nega¬
tion. The use of extinction as an investigative procedure in condi¬
tioning theory; interference in memory tasks; separation in mother-
infant bonding investigations; hiding in object-concept tasks and
indeed, any dependent-independent variable design are permeated at
every level with negation. Psychologists feel comfortable using
this notion, but for some mysterious reason do not regard negation as
a psychological phenomenon worthy of any but accidental investiga¬
tion. Negation has been left to the philosophers and has produced a
remarkable consensus from disparate sources.
"The learning of 'p' is essentially bound up with the learn¬
ing of 'not-p'. 'I do not hope you are better' - must be,
understood if 'I hope you are better' is understood."
"Language is rule-governed utterance and conventions of af¬
firmation and negation are the indispensable minimum of
rules. The difference between a language and a practice of
making arbitrary noises is that the former embodies a concept
of negation." (Quinton 1973)
"Freedom begins as an act of negation." (MacQuarrie 1982)
"All possibility of things must therefore be regarded as
derivative, with only one exception, namely the possibility
of that which includes in itself all reality. This latter
possibility must be regarded as original. For all negations
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(which are the only predicates through which anything can be
distinguished from the thing in itself) are merely limita¬
tions of a greater, and ultimately of the highest, reality,
and they therefore presuppose this reality and are, as re¬
gards their content, derived from it." (Kant 1933)
Analysis of a particular form of negation, nothingness or non-being,
has been attempted by a succession of philosophers from Heraclitus
onwards. The obscurity of their attempts is often matched by the
attractiveness of the resultant aphorisms.
Nothing abides, everything changes; Becoming shot through with
Being; Nothingness haunting Being, have been remembered where the
detail has been dismissed. When Sartre questions:
"But where does nothingness come from? If it is the original
condition of the questioning attitude and more generally of
all philosophical or scientific inquiry, what is the original
relation of the human being to nothingness? What is the ori¬
ginal nihilating conduct?"
there is little disagreement as to the validity and power of the
question. Similarly, Heideggers parody of a positivist's reaction to
his inquiry remains burlesque.
"He who speaks of nothing does not know what he is doing.
In speaking he speaks against what he intended. He contrad¬
icts himself.- But discourse that contradicts itself offends
against the fundamental rule of discourse, against "logic".
To speak of nothing is illogical. He who speaks and thinks
illogically is unscientific. But he who goes so far as to
speak of nothing in the realms of philosophy, where logic has
its very home, exposes himself most particularly to the accu¬
sation of offending against the fundamental rule of all
thinking. Such a speaking about nothing consists entirely
of meaningless propositions. Moreover: he who takes the
nothing seriously is allying himself with nothingness. He
is patently promoting the spirit of negation and serving the
cause of disintegration. Not only is speaking of nothing
utterly repellent to thought, it also undermines all culture
and faith. What disregards the fundamental law of thought
and also destroys faith and the will to build is pure nihil¬
ism". (Heidegger 1953)
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The positivist may indeed question the clarity of the analysis, but
not the impetus behind it. Negation appears to occupy a unique
place in the history of philosophy. It is a focus of agreement.
It transcends philosophical boundaries and its importance in logic,
epistemology, metaphysics and ontology has never been questioned.
Negation does not only make distinct language and arbitrary noises.
It also appears to be the defining feature of all systems of
knowledge. This is a fascinating phenomenon.
"Nothing, in fact, has had a more direct power of persuasion
than the error of being."
Astonishingly, one hundred years of psychology has produced not one
direct attempt to investigate the psychological aspects of negation.
1.2. Piaget's Account of Negation
Piaget was well qualified to construct a psychological account of
negation. He was an epistemologist, logician and psychologist.
Piaget's treatment of negation is articulated in 'Experiments in Con¬
tradiction' which is an attempt to investigate the relations between
contradiction and disequilibrium of action or thought. (Piaget 1980)
The intricacies of his analysis (he proposes 19 different classes of
contradiction; three forms of affirmation and three forms of nega¬
tion) are not relevant. Two points are relevant to this analysis.
Firstly, Piaget asserts the primacy of affirmation over negation.
"We did indeed observe a systematic disequilibrium favouring
affirmation, constituting the more natural and spontaneous
behavioural reactions, over negations, which, being much more
difficult to construct and handle, invariably lag behind af¬
firmations until one reaches operatory levels".
"At the perceptual level only positive characteristics are
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perceived and negation is not a process occurring in percep¬
tion" .
Secondly, Piaget asserts that the most general form of contradiction
is incomplete compensation between affirmation and negations.
"In sum, any action, however positive its goal, is inter¬
dependent upon two systems of negations, one external, which
sets it in opposition to that which is not itself when viewed
as affirmatively characterised by that goal, and the other
internal, rendering the positive character of the transfer in
the direction of the goal interdependent upon a subtraction
and moving away from the point of origin. Thus it is
neglect of such negative aspects that engenders contradic¬
tion" .
These conjectures are clear enough. Affirmations are constructed
before negations and absence of negations generates contradictions,
functional disequilibrium and development.. These conjectures can be
mapped onto the observed results.
Let affirmation be (T) and negation (F) in Table 8.2. Line 1 con¬
tains nothing but affirmations and according to Piaget should be con¬
structed first, and, indeed, (100,0) and (100,10) both contain Line 1
and both produce similar behaviours. Unfortunately, so does (0,100)
and it lacks Line 1. Piaget's hypothesis predicts more impetus in
(100,0) where there is no negation observed at the behavioural level.
Yet (100,10) produces a higher rate than (100,0). Both of Piaget's
hypotheses do not easily map onto the observed data. Obviously
there is something wrong with the mapping or something wrong with
Piaget's analysis.
The mapping is trivial and arbitrary. A reversal of the proposi-
tional content of 1 and m will change the results. But the mapping
is trivial because Piaget's analysis is trivial.
Piaget is unable to differentiate between affirmations and negations
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beyond the distinction that affirmations are "more natural and spon¬
taneous behavioural reactions". Are negations unnatural, premedi¬
tated behavioural reactions? In the above experiment the infant
affirms, negates, acquires and justifies. Piaget can assert that
leg-movement is a more natural behavioural reaction to mobile move¬
ment than to lack of mobile movement, but this assertion should be
seen for what it is, a value judgement not the result of a systematic
analysis. The analysis itself, is the final product of a value
judgement which has consistently regarded the infant as deficient or
impaired.
The philosophical consensus regarding negation includes Piaget:
"the affirmative or positive character of an action is indis¬
cernible from a negative aspect or exclusion, which sets that
action (a) in opposition to that which is not itself".
But Piaget is not willing to extend this consensus to the epistemo-
logical activities of the infant. Piaget delivers his last and
greatest insult to the infant. The infant is alone in the epistemo-
logical universe. Negation, the defining feature of knowledge sys¬
tems, is absent in the infant. In Piag*et's analysis there is no
such thing as the epistemic infant. In this search for a motor of
development the car appears to have been destroyed.
.9.3. An objection to value-judgements does not constitute an argu¬
ment against their justification. In addition to the problems of
\/
postdictive analysis, arbitrariness and pejoration, there are natural
and logical objections.
Piaget's thoughts on negation can be summarised as:
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ACQUISITION: Affirmations are acquired before negations
JUSTIFICATION: Negation is not a process occurring in perception
ACQUISITION: The absence of negations generate contradictions
JUSTIFICATION: Contradiction is incomplete compensation between
affirmation and negation.
It is not always clear whether Piaget is speaking about natural sys¬
tems or logical formal systems. The assertions can be questioned on
both levels.
On the logical level all the assertions can summarily dismissed.
At every level of logic acquisition of affirmations cannot be
separated from acquisition of negations. Thus Wittgenstein "The
positive proposition necessarily presupposes the existence of the
negative proposition and vice versa". Logical negation and logical
affirmation are not processes occurring in perception; they are
processes generated by the logician. The presence not the absence
of logical negation generates contradiction. Contradiction is com¬
plete compensation between affirmation and negation. Logical con¬
tradiction is the indiscriminate neutralisation of all TRUE state¬
ments because of absolute compensation between the opposing forces of
affirmation and negation.
The arguments against these assertions at the natural level are
equally compelling. For philosophers, anyway, the notion of a solo
affirmation is absurd. Isolated affirmations are not a naturally
occurring phenomenon in the natural world of the adult. Piagetians
may point out that the assertion of the primacy of affirmation is not
as philosophically isolated as has been claimed. Piaget appears to
have acquired this assertion from Kant.
"Negation and the mere form of intuition, in the absence of a
something real, are not objects". (Kant 1933)
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"Now no one can think a negation determinately, save by bas¬
ing it upon the opposed affirmation. Those born blind can¬
not have the least notion of darkness, since they have none
of light. The savage knows nothing of poverty, since he has
no acquaintance with wealth. The ignorant have no concept
of their ignorance, because they have none of knowledge, etc.
All concepts of negations are thus derivative; it is the
realities which contain the data, and, so to speak, the ma¬
terial or transcendental content, for the possibility and
complete determination of all things". (Kant 1933)
A decontextualised, shallow interpretation of Kant could be taken as
support for the primacy of affirmation and the absence of negation in
perception. A closer reading of Kant delivers another interpreta¬
tion. Kant classifies Negation as one of "the list of all original
pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within
itself a priori. Indeed, it is because it contains these concepts
that it is called pure understanding; for by them alone can it
understand anything in the manifold of intuition, that is, think an
object of intuition". (Kant 1933)
Kant appears to hold negation as distinguishing and determining and
as determined and derived. Piaget appears to have adopted the
latter description while ignoring the former. He also got the wrong
answer to the question: Determined and derived from what?
Kant's meaning is- clear although he omits Wittgensteins vice versa.
Thus no one can think a negation determinately save by basing it upon
the opposed affirmation and no one can think an affirmation (but one)
save by basing it upon the opposed negation. This interpretation is
articulated in the statement that negation "is the only predicate
through which anything can be distinguished from the thing-in-
itself". For Kant everything is derived from this one absolute
f i
affirmation, the thing-in itself, the ens realissimum. The thing-
in-itself is a transcendental ideal and universal. It is the con-
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cept of an individual being but it does not specify or separate indi¬
vidual beings. Negation allows this specification and separation.
In Kant's analysis everything is derived from the thing-in-itself.
Negation is the predicate which separates objects (all other affirma¬
tions) from the thing-in-itself.
The scale of the Piagetian misinterpretation becomes clear. Kant
claims negation is derived from and determined by the thing-in-
itself, but all other objects or affirmations are derived or
separated from the thing-in-itself by negation. Piaget claims Kant
as epistemological company and asserts that specific negations are
derived from specific affirmations. Piaget asserts that negation is
not a process occurring in perception. Kant asserts that negation
is a process occurring before perception. Kant asserts that a blind
infant has no notion of light or darkness. Piaget appears to assert
that at some stage a sighted infant has no notion of the dark.
These philosophical objections have their naturalistic counterparts.
From the moment of birth the infant acts as if it was aware of pairs
of contradictory predicates. The infant cannot breathe and it
cries; the infant is hungry and it cries; the infant is cold or hot
or tired or afraid of the dark or lonely and it cries. Its
behavioural response to these contradictory predicates is limited
from the adult's point of view, but the infant's conception of a
state of affairs with which it disagrees is crystalline. Every act
by the parent can be seen as a transfer experiment; as an attempt to
discover precisely what it is that the infant is negating. Most
parents become adept at transference to affectively affirmative con¬
tingencies. Piaget may be correct when he asserts that negation is
not a process occurring in perception; negation as Kant's analysis
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suggests may be a process or acquisition occurring before perception;
negation makes perception possible.
Piaget's second acquisition, the assertion that absence of negation
generates contradiction, collapses if his first acquisition, isolated
affirmations, is rejected. There are other problems.
The absence of anything can generate nothing. The presence of an
absence can generate something. The analysis has returned to
Chapter 4. How can non-learning influence learning?
The notion of incomplete compensation runs into similar difficulties.
An imbalance between two acquisitions may lead to development. But
there cannot be an imbalance between two acquisitions if only one is
acquired. Acquisition of a Piagetian natural contradiction would
necessitate disacquisition of a negation. The infant would have to
know where it was going before it could forget its destination in
order to get there.
Piaget appears to have created more problems than he solved by his
natural and logical divisions of contradiction. It is unfortunate
that his division was itself contradictory. Experimental evidence;
formal analysis; naturalistic observation and the philosophical con¬
sensus of recorded history indicate that Piaget's assertions are
unjustified. This investigation has not been iconoclastic.
Piaget's misconjectures themselves carry out a negative function.
They determine what can not be said about negation and in so doing
limit the possibilities for what can be said. Piaget, at least,
made an attempt. He realised the necessity for an attempt on nega¬
tion. Paradoxically, his analysis does not deal with necessity, but
with sequence and the problems generated can be traced to a predilec¬
tion for temporal analysis. The impossibility of a valuable temporal
80
distinction between acquisition and justification was realised in the
psycholinguists failure to differentiate linguistic transformations.
Piaget's attempts provide more evidence that epistemological
processes are not open, in any simple way, to temporal analysis.
An alternative approach is available. An attempt on negation may be
atemporal and formal; the philosophical insights of 2,500 years need
not be ignored and the behaviour of the infant whether naturalisti-
cally or experimentally observed should enter the analysis. However
Piaget created his analysis, he did not systematise it to concur with
these criteria.
1.4. A preliminary analysis can now be attempted.
In both the logical and the natural world the acquisition of affirma¬
tions cannot be separated from the acquisition of negations.
Negation is a process or acquisition constructed before perception.
Negation makes perception possible.
The notions of verification (TRUTH) and falsification (FALSEHOOD)
collapse without the prior acquisition of a pair of contradictory
predicates; affirmation and negation.
Affirmation of p and negation of not-p can, and indeed must amount to
the same thing. The infant can either affirm that the mobile moves
or deny that the mobile does not move.
Neither affirmation nor negation can be regarded as more natural or
more spontaneous than the other.
Negation has an object in addition to its corresponding affirmation.
Negation has a purpose.
In the natural world the justification of negation depends on natur¬
alistic observation. In the logical world the justification of
negation depends on formal observation. Negation in the logic of
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learning is different from negation in the logic of causation.
The purpose and nature of negation in any organism can only be
inferred from its behaviour.
The self-evidence of these points is disputed by the only extensive
analysis of negation in the infant. Piaget found no necessity for
any of these conjectures.
9.-5. As for justification the experimenter can only attempt to map
the logical content and structure of negation acquired by interpreta¬
tion of the infants observed behaviour onto the logical content and
structure of negations justified by the formal attributes of the dif¬
ferent conditions involved. The end point of the analysis is the
infants construction of negation.
l-l-l- The following interpretations were made to account for the
observed behaviour of the infant in the different conditions. In
general, negation is manifested in all of the different behavioural
categories already observed. The object, nature and structure of
these negations is, at the moment, unknown, but the fact of their
existence can only be disputed by rejecting the conjectures of 9.4
and denying that all determination is negation.
The analysis must attempt to account for the salient observations.
a) The distinct behavioural categories of (100,0), (100,10),
(0,100) and (0,0), (0,10), (0,50), (0,90).
b) The distinct behavioural categories of (0,0) and (0,10), (0,50),
(0,90).
c) The presence of a reaction (the infant by change in rate or




1) 100,10 0, 10
2) 100, 10 0,0
3) 100,0 0,0
4) 100,0 0, 100
5) 100,0 100,10
6) 0,0 100,10
7) 0, 100 0,90
d) The absence of a reaction (the infant appears unaware that some¬





9.J5.2. The formal attributes of negation can be examined on three
levels. The level of the infant's behaviour (1), the level of the
external event (m) and the level of the relationship between the two
(r). The following categories are involved:
Acquired propositions - TRUE or FALSE
Affirmed propositions and negated propositions
Observed (Justified) propositions and Unobserved (Unjustified) propo¬
sitions .
The complete inventory of logical categories would therefore demand
24 different categories. Fortunately the analysis can reduce the
categories.
The unjustified categories are relevant in that they provide the
source for projections at each level. But because the analysis
seeks to explicate justification through negation, only the justified
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categories are of interest at each level.
Affirmation and negation must be able to say the same thing, there¬
fore the truth value of the propositional content is irrelevant to
the formal construction (although as will be seen it may play an
important part in the formal mapping by the infant). Thus justified
affirmed true propositions and justified affirmed false propositions
can be defined together as justified affirmed propositions (JA).
Similarly justified negated false propositions and justified negated
true propositions can be defined together as justified negated propo¬
sitions (JN).
The different conditions can therefore be examined according to the
possible observations and projections of affirmation and negation at
each level. Only three categories are required:
Relevant but unjustified propositions (R)
Justified affirmed propositions (JA)
Justified negated propositions (JN)
The preliminary analysis at 9.4 produces two further restrictions
relevant to the formal analysis.
JA and JN at each level must provide pairs of contradictory predi¬
cates. Thus the formal analysis will project a specific JN from a
specific JA or vice versa.
Negation has an object by which the corresponding affirmation is con¬
structed and vice versa. The formal analysis can only proceed by
specification of the object. The only object available is the truth
value of the propositional content at each level. Thus the formal
infant can justify relationships only by observation of TRUE proposi¬
tions or by observation of FALSE propositions.
The formal analysis produced by the above specification; (Three
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observable levels; behaviour (1), external event (m) and relation¬
ship (r). Three logical categories; relevant propositions (R), jus¬
tified affirmed propositions (JA) and justified negated propositions
(JN). Two objects of justification; TRUE propositions and FALSE pro¬










1 m r 1 m r 1 m r
100,0 1 T T T JA JA JA R R R
2 F T T JN1 R R R JN4 JNS
3 T F T R JN1 R JN4 R JN7
4 F F T R R JA JA JA R
5 T T F R R JN1 JN6 JN7 R
6 F T F R JA R JA R JA
7 T F F JA R R R JA JA
8 F F F JN7 JN6 JN4 R R R
100,10 1 T T T JA JA JA JN2 R R
2 F T T JN1 JA JA JA JN4 R
3 T F T R JN1 R JN4 R JN7
4 F F T R JN2 JA JA JA R
5 T T F R JA JN1 JN6 JN7 R
6 F T F R JA JN2 JA R R
7 T F F JA - JN5 R JN8 JA JA
8 F F F JN7 JN5 JN4 JA R R
0, 10 1 T T T R R R JN2 JN3 JN5
0,50 2 F T T R JA JA JA JN4 R
0,90 3 T F T JA R JA JN4 JA R
4 F F T JN3 JN2 JA JA JA R
5 T T F JA JA R JN6 JN7 JA
6 F T T JN5 R JN2 JA JN8 R
7 T F F R JN5 JN3 JN8 JA R
8 F F F R R JN4 JA JA R
0, 100 1 T T T R R R JN2 JN3 JN5
2 F T T R JA JA JA R R
•3 T F T JA R JA R JA R
4 F F F JN3 JN2 R R R JNS
5 T T F JA JA R R R JA
6 F T F JN5 R JN2 R JN8 R
7 T F F R JN5 JN3 JN8 R R
8 F F F R R P. JA JA JA
86












R R R R JN3 JN5





JA R JA JN4 JA R
JN3 R JA JA JA R
JA R R JN6 JN7 JA
JN5 R R JA JN8 JA
R R JN3 R JA R
R R JN6 R JA R
Table 9.5.2 defines the formal attributes at each level. A specific
analysis at every level would be very cumbersome. A preliminary
analysis can be attempted by making a formal comparison between con¬
ditions .
When justification is by observation of true propositions:
a) At the level of the behaviour:
(100,0) and (100,10) are identical
(0,0), (0,10), (0,50), (0,90) and (0,100) are identical.
b) At the level of the external event:
(100,0) is unique
(100,10) is unique and contains (100,0), (0,0), (0,10), (0,50)
and (0,90).
(0,0) is unique
(0,10), (0,50) and (0,90) and (0,100) are identical
c) At the level of the relationship:
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(100,0) is unique
(100,10) is unique and contains (100,0)
(0,0) is unique
(0,10), (0,50) and (0,90) are identical and contain (0,0) and
(0,100)
(0,100) is unique.
When justification is by observation of false propositions:
d) At the level of the behaviour:
(100,0) and (0,0) are identical
(100,10), (0,10), (0,501 and (0,90) are identical and contain
(0,0), (100,) and (0,100)
(0,100) is unique.
e) At the level of the external event:
(100,0) and (100,10) are identical
(0,0), (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90) are identical and contain
(100,0), (100,10) and (0,100)
(0,100) is unique.
f) At the level of the relationship:
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(100,0) is unique and contains (100,10)
(100,10) is unique
(0,0) is unique and contains (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90)
(0,10), (0,50) and (0,90) are identical
(0,100) is unique and contains (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90).
.9.6. A mapping of 9.5.1 onto 9.5.2 is considerably complicated by
the possibility of a justificatory imbalance between affirmation and
negation at different levels. For example, justification could be
carried out by the infant by an analysis of affirmation at one level
and negation at a different level.
A further complication arises from the possibility of a further
imbalance between the objects of the justification. Thus justifica¬
tion could be carried out by the infant by analysis of affirmation at
one level for one truth value and analysis of negation at another
level for the other (or possibly the same) truth value.
The infant must indeed have acquired the affirmation if the negation
is acquired and vice versa, but the infant is under no compulsion to
give these acquisitions equality in justificatory importance. The
necessity for a formal balance between affirmation and negation is
reflected in acquisition, but not in justification. However it has
been noted that affirmations and negations can only exist as matched
pairs. This must apply in both acquisition and justification.
Thus in the natural world any affirmation once acquired may be
matched with a negation once acquired. For the purposes of justifi¬
cation, affirmations and negations may not be fixed.
The greatest complication is the possibility that two types of
89
negation are involved; one from the logic of learning; one from the
logic of causation. The analysis would be made easier if indeed one
negation was merely a stricter version of the other. For example,
negation from causation could contain negation from learning plus
some other restriction on justification. There is no guarantee that
this is the case. The acquisition of the two logics may be identi¬
cal, but negations may be very different. The different conditions
justified may reflect this difference.
In spite of these considerable complications the mapping can be
attempted with the aid of the observed behaviour, formal necessities
and the processes already discovered. The analysis can move from
the simplest interpretation of negation to the more complex.
9.6.J.. The simplest construction of negation is its placement at the
level of the behaviour or at the level of the external event when
true propositions are affirmed.
Conditioning theory could assimilate either construction, but the
choice would have to be consistent.
These interpretations are quickly refuted by the observed evidence.
9.5.2 a) and b) do not make the necessary distinctions between condi¬
tions. For example, 9.5.2 a) cannot explain the presence of a
transfer reaction from (100,0) to (100,10). 9.5.2 b) cannot explain
the transfer reaction from (0,100) to (0,90).
In summary;
9.5.2 a) accounts for 9.5.1 c) 1) to 4) and 9.5.1 d) 1) to 3). It
does not account for 9.5.1 a); 9.5.1 b) and 9.5.1 c) 5) to 7).
9.5.2 b) accounts for 9.5.1 b) ; 9.5.1 c) 3) to 6) and 9.5.1 d) 1) to
3). It does not account for 9.5.1 a) and 9.5.1 c) 1) and 2).
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1..6.2. Negation constructed only at the level of relationships when
true propositions are affirmed contains the formal differentiation
necessary for specification of different conditions. 9.5.2 a)
accounts for 9.5.1 b); 9.5.1 c) 1) to 7) and 9.5.1 d) 1) to 3). It
does not account for 9.5.1 a) in any obvious manner.
.9.6.3. Negation constructed as for 9.6.1, but when false proposi¬
tions are affirmed does not map onto the observed evidence any better
than 9.6.1.
9.5.2 d) accounts for 9.5.1 c) 4) to 7) and 9.5.1 d) 1) to 3). It
does not account for 9.5.1 a); 9.5.1 b) and 9.5.1 c) 1) to 3).
9.5.2 e) accounts for 9.5.1 c) 1) to 4), 7) and 9.5.1 d) 1) to 3).
It does not account for 9.5.1 a); 9.5.1 b) and 9.5.1 c) 5), 6).
3.6.J. Negation constructed at the level of the relationship when
false propositions are affirmed contains the formal differentiation
necessary for specification of different conditions. 9.5.2 f)
accounts for 9.5.1 b); 9.5.1 c) 1) to 4), .6) and 7). It does not
account for 9.5.1 a) in any obvious manner; 9.5.1 c) 5) and 9.5.1 d)
1) to 3).
9.7. The Logic of Learning
If negation is constructed only at one level, the interpretation pro¬
vided by construction.at the level of the relationship when True pro¬
positions are affirmed and False propositions are negated produces
the best account of the observed data. 9.6.2 accounts for all but
9.5.1 a). But the account of negation relevant to the Logic of
Learning need not account for this observation. The interpretation
offered in Chapter 8 places 9.5.1 a) as an observation relevant to
the Logic of Causation.
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9.6.2 therefore accounts for all the data relevant to the logic of
learning. Negation and justification are constructed on this level.
Now that the level has been identified, the details of this construc¬
tion can be examined.
Table 9.7
Justification by Affirmation of True Propositions and Negation of
False Propositions at level (r) for experimental conditions.
CONDITION




1 T T T JA JA R R R
2 F T T R JA JA JA R
3 T F T R R JA JA JA
4 F F T JA JA JA R JA
5 T T F JN1 JN1 R R R
6 F T F R JN2 JN2 JN2 R
7 T F F R R JN3 JN3 JN3
8 F F F JN4 JN4 JN4 R JN4
Table 9.7 shows in detail how the infant differentiates between con¬
ditions. The questions about negation in the logic of learning can
now be specified.-
1) Is it presence or absence of justification which differentiates
learning conditions.
2) Are affirmations and negations inextricably bonded or is there
primacy of one over the other.
The first question has already been answered. Two symmetrical
observations provide strong evidence that it is the presence of jus¬
tified observations which differentiates conditions.
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The infant reacts to transfer from (100,0) to (100,10) and from
(0,100) to (0,90). The infant does not react to transfer from
(100,10) to (100,0) and from (0,90) to (0,100).
The infant differentiates the conditions in the first case and fails
to differentiate in the second. From Table 9.7 it can be seen that
(100,0) is implied by (100,10); (100,10) contains all the justifica¬
tions that define (100,0), plus two more. Likewise (0,100) is
implied by (0,90); (0,90) contains all the justifications that
define (0,100), plus two more. The infant does not react to
transfer to (100,0) and (0,100) because no new relevant lines have
been justified. The implication is that constructed justifications
are retained, they do not fall back into relevance as an 'out of
sight out of mind' hypothesis would predict. It is the presence of
justification which differentiates conditions in the logic of learn¬
ing .
The second question concerns the bonding and primacy of affirmation
and negation. On the observational level the analysis does not
appear to offer an answer. By definition every affirmation has a
*
corresponding negation. Observed differentiation may be attributed
to either but no evidence is forthcoming.
A teleological and formal analysis delivers a veridical answer. The
infant in order to develop later adult acquisition must have in its
logical repertoire all eight lines of Table I. The infant in order
to develop later adult acquisition must possess a notion of negation.
But where can this notion of negation be applied in the logic of
learning? To make learning possible the infant must categorise all
relationships as logical. For the infant there are no non-logical
relationships. The notion of negation cannot therefore be applied
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outwith the level of the logic. The logic of being and the logic of
learning appear to be similar and different from all other logics in
this respect. Negation for both is always directed within the
logic. Only with these two logics is there this imbalance between
affirmation and negation. In the logic of being the infant must
affirm that an object has being or non-being. In the logic of
learning the infant must affirm that a relationship is affirmed or
negated. In both cases outwith the level of the logic there is no
negation present. In all other logics, negation transcends the con¬
struction of the content of the logic. Thus the infant affirms and
negates causal relationships or affectionate relationships or fearful
relationships.
It appears that the logic of being and the logic of learning are the
only logics where affirmation and negation are not inextricably
linked. For the infant there are no not-being or non-logical rela¬
tionships .
But negation must enter the analysis somewhere, otherwise the infant
will affirm everything and deny nothing. In the logic of learning
the only possibility for this negatory input is at the level of the
relationship r. There can be no imbalance at this level. All jus¬
tified affirmations have a corresponding negation. At the level of
the relationships defined within the logic of learning, affirmation
and negation must be inextricably bonded. One cannot be prior to the
other in any sense; thus one cannot be acquired before the other, or
justified before the other. Piaget's assertion is formal nonsense.
Because there is no primacy to affirmation or to negation in the
logic of learning the infant must regard both as being of equal value
within the epistemic process. In effect, the infant sheds the
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affirmation or negation label with its attendant value judgements.
Any affirmations or negations observed are justified.
This raises the fascinating possibility that infants operate from
what appears to the adult to be a perpetually contradictory state of
affairs.
Every time the infant justifies,
Line 1) T T T
the infant also justifies
Line 5 T T F
Every time the infant justifies
Line 2) F T T
the infant also justifies
Line 6) F T F
Much infant behaviour from the investigators point of view is con¬
sistently perplexing. But contradictory behaviour is not contradic¬
tory within a contradictory logic.
J9..8. The Logic of Causation
Causation can be treated as a special form of learning; personal
efficacy rather than general efficacy. There is, of course, no
guarantee that this is the case. Justification in the logic of cau¬
sation could be carried out at any of the levels outlined in 9.6. A
quick examination of justification constructed by affirmation of true
propositions eliminates levels 1 and m. In both cases (0,100) is
formally identical to (0,0), (0,50) and (0,90).
As a working assumption causation can be initially treated as a spe¬
cial form of learning. The level for analysis is therefore the
relational level when true propositions are affirmed. Even with the
advantage of the insight that it may be irrelevant to justification
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whether construction is by affirmation or by negation, no obvious
differentiation is available. The behavioural categories are clear.
All the behavioural evidence indicates that:
Something about (100,0), (100,10) and (0,100) justifies the construc¬
tion of a causal relationship.
Something about (0,0), (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90) justifies the con¬
struction of a non-causal relationship.
The simplest interpretation would point to the presence or absence of
a particular justification as definitive for causation.
(100,0) and (100,10) do differ from (0,0), (0,10), (0,50) and (0,90)
in that justification at Lines 1) and 5) is present, at Lines 3) and
7) is absent in the causal condition. But (0,100) does not display
these differences. Lines 1) and 5) are not justified and Lines 3)
and 7) are justified in (0,100).
Neither will the analytic problem be solved by projection of a change
in propositional content in (0,100). If propositional content is
changed in (0,100), then why not in (0,0), (0,10), (0,50), (0,90) and
eventually (100,0) and (100,10)? Such an explanation may produce a
coherent interpretation, but the inclusion of an ad hoc theoretical
specification cannot be denied.
A more complex interpretation is that definition of causation is
brought about by analysis of a particular nexus of justifications.
This interpretation is easily refuted by the unassailable fact that
(0,100) is contained within (0,10) (0,50) and (0,90). Whatever
nexus is present within (0,100) is also present in the non-causal
conditions.
The analysis has come to an end for the question about the presence
or absence of justification. It is neither the presence nor the
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absence of justification which differentiates causal from non-causal
conditions. The question can be reformulated.
Is it present or absence of relevant categories which differentiates
causal from non-causal conditions?
Table 9.7 shows that there is a consistent difference between causal
and non- causal conditions. All eight lines are relevant between
the three causal conditions. Only Lines 1, 2, 5 and 6 are relevant
between the non-causal conditions. The analysis appears to offer
two answers. (100,10) and (100,0) are differentiated from non-causal
conditions by the presence of relevance at Lines 3) and 7). (0,100)
is differentiated from non-causal conditions by the presence of
relevance at Lines 4) and 8).
But Lines 3, 4, 7 and 8 have something in common. They are the com¬
plete set of lines produced by observation of the mobile at rest.
It is not the absence of justification which defines causation, it is
the presence of relevance at the relational level for a restricted
category. The infant defines relationships as causal when relevant
observations are made of non-mobile movement. The infant defines
relationships as non-causal when no relevant observations are made of
non-mobile movement.
This interpretation is coherent, systematic, accounts for all the
observations and is entirely implausible to most adults and all
behaviourists. In behavioural terms, the infant appears to observe
the presence of an absence (Relevance without justification) of the
non- occurrence of a reinforcement (Non-mobile movement).
Are there any other interpretations? All of the information avail¬
able to the infant is contained within Table 9.5.2. Justification
of causation by affirmation of false propositions has not yet been
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examined.
Level 1 cannot provide an interpretation. (100,10) is identical to
(0,10, (0,50) and (0,90).
Level m does provide an interpretation. The non-causal conditions
at level m display justification of all lines.
(100,0) and (100,10) have justification present at lines 2, 4, 5 and
7.
(100,0) and (100,10) have relevance present at lines 1, 3, 6 and 8.
(0,100) has justification present at lines 1, 3, 6 and 8.
(0,100) has relevance present at lines 2, 4, 5 and 7.
Because of this symmetry between (0,100) and (100,0), (100,10) the
presence or absence of any particular justification or relevance can¬
not be the differentiating feature in causation. But the complete
justification in the non-causal condition means that the causal con¬
dition (bould be defined either by the presence of any relevance or
the absence of any justification.
Level r provides an interpretation. Non-causal conditions have jus¬
tification present at lines 1, 2, 5 and G and relevance present at
all lines. Causal conditions have justification present at all
lines and relevance present at all lines. Differentiation could
therefore be achieved by the presence of justification at lines 3, 4,
7 and 8.
There is an obvious symmetry with the first interpretation. This
symmetry is a product of the formal construction of Table 9.5.2.
They are, however, very different interpretations. All three
interpretations account for the observed behavioural categories.
Can a choice be made between them?
INTERPRETATION 1 : Justification in the logic of causation is con-
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structed at the relational level by observation of the relationships
defined as m(F) when true propositions are affirmed.
INTERPRETATION 2 : Justification in the logic of causation is con¬
structed at the level of the external event by observation of com¬
plete or incomplete justification when false propositions are
affirmed.
INTERPRETATION 3 : Justification in the logic of causation is con¬
structed at the relational level by observation of the relationships
defined as m(F) when false propositions are affirmed.
1.8.J.. All three interpretations concur in the absolute categorisa¬
tion of conditions as causal and non-causal.. Choice between
interpretations cannot be made by using contrastive predictions.
Choice can be made using other evidence.
Interpretations 1 and 3 are implied by 2. Interpretation^ 1 and 3
are more restrictive. They make specific claims about particular
relationships. Thus they are more open to falsification. Interpre¬
tations 1 and 3 are superior with respect to refutability.
Interpretation 1 is easier to understand. Most adults find it
easier to affirm true propositions and negate false propositions.
Interpretations 2 and 3 affirm false propositions and negate true
propositions. Interpretation 1 is superior with respect to communica.-
bility.
Interpretations 1 and 3 are supported by the observed differences in
behaviour in (0,0) and other non-causal conditions. Something about
(0,0) allows easy construction of a non-causal connection. Interpre¬
tation 2 does not differentiate (0,0) from other non-causal condi¬
tions. Interpretation 1 assimilates this, observation by stating
that the only justified relationships observed in (0,0) are non-
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causal. Interpretation 1 is superior with respect to observed evi¬
dence .
Interpretations 1 and 3 are more consistent than 2. It is a
theoretical inconsistency to claim that infants learn logical connec¬
tions by observation of specific logical relationships, but abandon
this particular observation for an absolute in causal relationships.
Interpretations 1 and 3 are superior with respect to consistency.
The theory acquired by learning can be transferred direct to causa¬
tion only in Interpretation 1. Just one specification is required,
the role of content in not-m relationships. Interpretation 1 is
superior with respect to parsimony.
Interpretation 1 is affirmed.
.9.9. Summary
The unique status of negation was explicated. Negation produces
consensus in thinkers as diverse as Neitzsche and Spinoza. For both
"All determination is negation". Piaget's treatment of negation was
analysed and dismissed.
A preliminary analysis and mapping using formal structure and
observed evidence produced veridical results for the logic of learn¬
ing. Only one interpretation is available. Justification is con¬
structed by the observation of relationships produced by the affirma¬
tion of true propositions and the negation of false propositions.
The differentiating categories are justification and relevance. The
presence of justification has differentiating primacy. Within the
logics of being and learning, affirmation and negation are inextrica¬
bly lined.
Justification in the logic of causation is constructed by a specified
negation applied to the logic of learning. Causal relationships are
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defined by observation of relevant categories in m(F). Non-causal
relationships are defined by observation of justified categories in





The infant at the beginning of this study was characterised as inade¬
quate. This prejudice is inherent in every "What children cannot do"
approach. The very few positive statements about infant's cognitive
capacities are couched in patronising or cautious language.
"I hold that recent work supports the view that the pre¬
schooler possesses some cognitive capacities, capacities that
might be less complex than, or even different from, those of
the older child, but which are nevertheless very real." (Gel-
man 1978)
The infants' behaviour in this experimental situation can be inter¬
preted as simple, chaotic, accidental, random or reflex. These
interpretations are parsimonious, coherent and communicable. They
are also irrefutable; they ignore the experimental evidence, the
necessities of formal analysis and teleology; they do not therefore
qualify as scientific interpretations. An approach which concurs
with the restraints produced by the necessities of formality, teleol¬
ogy and observed behaviour produces a very different characterisa¬
tion. This epistemological analysis indicates that the cognitive
capacities of the infant have been underestimated. The following
facts are asserted from the preceding analysis. They apply to 13 to
20 week old infants.
The infant possesses notions of propositional capability, permanence,
identity and negation. The infant uses these notions to acquire and
justify knowledge.
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The infants acquisitive capability is different from the adults.
The infant can acquire any logical relationship acquired by the
adult. The converse is not true. The adults' acquisitive capabil¬
ities are inadequate when compared to the infants'. The infant jus¬
tifies knowledge for a particular purpose. Justification varies
with logics. Justification in the logic of learning is different
from justification in the logic of causation. Justification in the
logic of learning is constructed at the relational level by observa-
<
tion of logical categories when true propositions are affirmed.
Justification in the logic of causation is constructed as for the
logic of learning, but with one added specification. It is not the
presence of justified relationships, but the presence of relevant
relationships which defines causal conditions.
The questions asked in Chapter 3 can now be answered.
_1jQ.JL- The Logic of Learning
1) Does the infant use a two-valued logic or a different system?
The infant uses a two-valued system both in acquisition and justifi¬
cation. The infant uses a two-valued system which generates matched
pairs of predicates. These pairs are not contradictory to the
infant. They are inherently contradictory to the adult. The infant
appears to learn through construction of contradiction. The adult
cannot learn with contradiction.
2) The infants' construction of negation has been explicated.
3) Is the infants' logic synchronically fixed or flexible?
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The infants' logic is flexible for relevant categories and fixed for
justified categories. Justified categories once constructed are
held; they do not fall back into -relevance.
4) The logic is not reversible.
5) What is the import of propositional content?
The system is content free. Any propositional content may be
acquired. The relationships generated by affirmation and negation
differentiate conditions. The content itself is irrelevant.
6) The interaction between external world and behaviour is bal¬
anced. The infant delivers primacy to neither behaviour nor
external event. Analysis up to the relational level is neu¬
tral. Thus behaviour is not epistemologically more useful than
non-behaviour. Mobile movement is not epistemologically more
useful than non-movement. Justification is constructed at the
relational level.
7a) There are no optimal conditions for learning. All conditions
are learning or logical conditions.
7b) The analysis cannot answer the developmental question, but it
does provide the method whereby the question can be answered.
Paradoxically, veridical observations from adults in learning
situations may be harder to achieve because of the different
influence of other logics, especially language.
7c) The infant never finds its learning theory untenable. The
infant does not verify or falsify the application of the logic
of being and the logic of learning. These two logics are
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inherent in and essential for all other constructions. They can
only be applied.
10.2. The Logic of Causation
1) Does the infant use a two-value logic or a different system?
The infant uses the same system already outlined in the logic of
learning.
2) The infants' construction of negation has been explicated.
3) Is the infant's logic synchronically fixed or flexible?
The logic of causation appears remarkably inflexible. Causal con¬
structions are not given up quietly. Primitive denial or violence
appears instead of reversibility. Likewise, non-causal construc¬
tions are not easily superceded by causal constructions. In some
respects the infant is an absolute optimist or an absolute pessimist.
4) The logic if not reversible.
.
5) What is the import of propositional content?
The system is content bound at 1. The necessary content at 1 is the
efficacious self. The system is content free at m and r.
6) The interaction between event, behaviour and non-behaviour is
balanced.
The infant delivers primacy to the non-event not-m. The non-event
is epistemologically more important than others. It provides the
defining category for causation.
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7a) The optimal conditions for discovering causal conditions are
those which are defined by the presence of relevance at Lines 3,
4, 7 and 8.
The minimal conditions for discovering causal conditions are those
which are defined by the presence of relevance at Lines 3 and 7 or at
Lines 4 and 8.
The optimal conditions for discovering non-causal conditions are
those which are defined by the presence of justification at Lines 3,
4, 7 and 8 and the presence of relevance elsewhere.
The minimal conditions.. for discovering non-causal conditions are
those which are defined by the presence of justification at Lines 3,
4 7 and 8 and the presence of justification elsehwere.
7b) Again the analysis cannot answer the developmental question.
7c) The infant never finds it causal theory untenable. Things are
in a non-causal relationship or Things are in a causal relation¬
ship .
.10. .3. Implications





















The unobserved causal condition (100,100) is not a causal condition
for the adult. The adult would certainly not impute any personal
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efficacy to a condition which exhibits constant movement regardless
of behaviour. The fact that the infant may impute a personal effi¬
cacy to such a situation does not make the infants' analysis defec¬
tive or inadequate or out of touch with reality. Formally, the
infants' analysis is perfect and from the point of view of survival
there are obvious advantages in maintaining an interest in moving
things.
The point is open to empirical investigation.
10.J.2. Extension The theory is content free at all but 1 in the
logic of causation and has considerable potential. It can be
extended to all situations and experiments which can be represented
in terms of components or propositions. Because all experiments are
represented in terms of indpendent variables, by definition all
experiments can be represented propositionally. Thus the theory
provides the means whereby a unifying theory can be constructed.
This theory will assimilate findings from diverse experimental situa¬
tions whether natural, logical, social, abnormal or object concept.
Several well known phenomena are theoretically illuminated.
The infant fascinated by repetition of toy-throwing from the pram and
recovery of the toy by the adult has been explained by use of "the
out of sight out of mind" hyypothesis. This hypothesis is redundant
in other object concept situations but the phenomenon remains.
This phenomenon is better explained epistemologically. The infant
wants to acquire logical content and structure for at least three
logics; being, learning and causation. The infant learns that
throwing is observed with object disappearance and reappearance. If
the proposition m at the level of the external event is object
appearance then the efficacious infant will be more interested in
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object non-appearance not-m. But the infant is never allowed to
justify Lines 3, 4, 7 and 8 as long as the adult is playing the game.
Therefore the infant observes relevance at these lines and defines
the situation as causal. The infant's anger at the end of the game
is not assuaged by the toy. The infant's anger is the same anger
observed in transfer from (100,0) to (0,0). The theory predicts
that at termination of the game the adult should not give the infant
the toy. At least this disappearance (m(F)) will provide the infant
with the required content at lines 3, 4, 7 and 8. The reaction to
change from causal to non-causal condition will still emerge, but the
anger may be ameliorated because the infant has got some of what it
wants. Its logical structure has been completed. Another well-
documented phenomenon is the 'AAB' error.
"The Stage IV infant, though, still seems to have a peculiar
concept of objects. The infant will look for an object if
the object is hidden under a cloth. If, however, the infant
is allowed to find an object under the same cloth two or more
times, and then, the object is hidden within the infant's
view, but under a different cloth in a different place, the
infant will look for the object in its original place under
the first cloth - totally ignoring the actual location of the
object. This happens even if the hidden object is quite
large; the infant will still pick up the flat cloth that had
previously covered the object. This error implies that the
infant does not yet really understand that an object that has
been covered by a cloth is under the cloth. The infant seems
to think that an object that has been hidden will always be
found in the same place". (Bower 1982)
The epistemological theory delivers a totally different implication.
There has been no error. The infant understands that an object that
has been covered by a cloth is under the cloth. The infant, in an
attempt to fill in the logic of learning and causation must observe
not-m or where the object is not. In the eyes of the adult; the
infant makes an error because the adult assumes the infant is looking
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for the object. In the epistemology of the infant there is no error.
The infant gains more information by observation where the object is
not; not-m; then by repetition of observation of where the object
is; m. Again the infants anger and surpise is manifested because
lines 3 and 4 have been justified. The infant looks 1 and does not
look not-1 and the object is gone not-m; justification by observa¬
tion is complete and a causal situation is redefined as non-causal.
The infants subsequently apparently random search activities are not
random; they are successful attempts to justify lines 3, 4, 7 and 8.
The infant is learning.
The epistemological analysis predicts that given two cloths and con¬
sistent hiding under one cloth, the infant will attempt to look under
the other cloth. This behaviour, of course, is easily explained away
by the ad hoc descriptivists as boredom. It is at best an incon¬
sistency that the same behaviour should be simultaneously seen as an
interesting error and as totally irrelevant.
The theory can similarly encompass all other relevant propositionally
represented phenomena.
10.3.3. Interaction The analysis makes absolute statements about
the interaction between the logics. Learning emerges from Being;
Causation from Learning. There will be no point in development where
the infant ascribes efficacy to self and not to others. The infant
may indeed attribute all external events to personal activity, but
self and others are defined as personal. This view is diametrically
opposed to Piagetian interpretations.
"Causality consists in an organisation of the universe caused
by the totality of relations established by action and then
by representation between objects as well as between object
and subject. Hence causality presupposes at all levels an
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interaction between self and things, but if the radical
eqocentrism of the beginnings first leads the subject to at¬
tribute all external events to personal activity, the forma¬
tion of a permanent universe subsequently enables the self to
be located among things and to understand the totality of the
sequences which it sees or in which it is engaged as cause
and effect."
"Just as people doubtless constitute the first permanent ob¬
jects recognised by the baby, so also they are very probably
the first objectified sources of causality because, through
imitating someone else, the subject rapidly succeeds in at¬
tributing to his model's action an efficacy analogous to his
own". (Piaget 1955)
In Piagets view, observation or construction of the efficacious self
is a necessity for observation or construction of efficacious others.
An opposing analysis is offered. The efficacious other is a neces¬
sity for the efficacious self. Piaget sees the infant as a mego-
lomaniac with delusions of cosmic omnipotence. The opposing analysis
suggests that the infant is a logician.
In addition to the argument that gods don't cry, but logicians do;
an interesting empirical approach could contrast the constructions of
the infant as causal participant and as causal observer.
.10..3.4. Development The analysis does not offer an answer to the
why of development, but it imples an answer to the 'how'. Some of
the important features of the infant's logics have been determined.
Similar features of the adult's logics are also said to be known. A
contrast between the two should indicate what specifications the
infant must make to acquire later logics.
The logics of normal infants appear to be surprisingly alike and
surprisingly unlike the logics of normal adults. Infants appear to
use an absolute, two- valued but contradictory reasoning ability com¬
bined with a very abstract notion of negation. Adult logic can be
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characterised as probabilistic, two-valued and actualised with regard
to negation. Many adults find it very difficult to even think about
negation in the abstract.
A change from infant to adult logic can be brought about by one
structural change. The developing human must eventually apply the
law of contradiction at the relational level. This application will
restrict the infant's acquisition (Any combination or permutation of
Table I) to the adult's acquisition (Table II).
It is clear that the infant is aware of the law of contradiction.
The infant's reaction to non-causal transfer conditions after causal
initial conditions can only be explained by the possession of 'never
p and not-p'. The infant projects the non-existence of the causal
condition from the existence of the non-causal condition. The puzzle
is why should the infant possess a logical distinction (contradic¬
tion) but not use it in some of its constructions. The infant uses
the distinction to separate causal from non-causal conditions but the
infant does not make use of the distinction during justification at
the relational level. T T F is not contradicted by T T T. There
are a number of ad hoc answers to this puzzle. Contradiction may be
action based, content free or content bound. An answer, consistent
with the preceding analysis, is produced by the insight that being
and learning are always applied. It is impossible for these appli¬
cations to be negated. The application of being and learning is
always appropriate. Negation exists only within these two logics.
In all other logics negation exists both within and outwith all
applications. Thus the law of contradiction may only be applied if
the logic itself can be affirmed and negated. The law of contradic¬
tion can therefore be applied to causation, there are causal rela-
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tionships and non-causal relationships, but not to learning, there
are only learning relationships.
This interpretation implies that at the point where the infant
asserts, adult-like, the existence of learning and non-learning rela¬
tionships', the infants logical values will collapse and the adult
values emerge. This assertion is itself constructed by the applica¬
tion of negation to the logic of learning. In effect, the infant's
logic of learning collapses into the adult's formal justification of
causation (Table II). This collapse could explain why certain
categories have generated the bulk of research on learning and causa¬
tion. Because learning has become causation, causation itself may
be pushed into the more restricted categories of Lines 3, 4 and 9
Table II. Investigators consider that there is something 'natur¬
ally' causative about these relationships, because these are undeni¬
ably the relationships investigated. They are partial reinforce¬
ment; non-contingent reinforcement and 100% reinforcement. All the
other relationships are ignored. They are not considered learning
or causal relationships even although the adult possesses the formal
proof that they are precisely what they are said not to be.
The infant is not' the only one who may possess the law of contradic¬
tion but fail to apply it.
10.3.5. Problems
The analysis has produced a consistent theory. Several important
questions remain unanswered.
The infant's acquisition and justification of propositional content
is a process which may require a separate explanatory logic. Empir¬
ical isolation of this process may be very difficult.
Propositional content is linked to the major unresolved problem. If
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indeed, the infant's logics are absolute and situations are defined
as causal or non-causal, the infant must learn to abandon this
analysis. Reassessment of the situation must be made before adaptive
change can occur. Thus different propositional content can inhabit
identical logical structures and identical propositional content can
inhabit different logical structures. The infants analysis cannot be
content bound and it cannot be permanent. The world changes and the
infant must change with it.
The analysis has been deliberately restricted to logical structure.
Time and content have been intentionally removed. A full analysis
must eventually cope with changes in content and changes in analysis
over time. The infants application of reversibility to content and
structure over time is the major logical feature undetermined by the
preceding analysis.
_10.3.j>. Conclusions A theory directed at the epistemological
processes of the infant has been produced. Empirical evidence was
collected and collated with respect to theory. Invigoration of the
theoretically static domain of cognitive development in infancy was
the result.
The analysis shows that data collection emanating from one simple
experimental situation yields unlimited procedural possibilities.
No progress can be made without a theoretical framework.
"It is we alone who have fabricated causes, succession, re¬
ciprocity, relativity, compulsion, number, law, freedom,
motive, purpose; and when we falsely introduce this world of
symbols into things and mingle it with them as though this
symbol-world were an 'in itself', we once more behave as we
have always behaved, namely mythologically". (NIETZSCHE)
The infant is different from us and not a mythological creature.
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24 infants aged between 13 and 20 weeks provided 42 visits for ini¬





















Mean rate of response by centile time in condition.
Mean percentage rate of response by centile time in condition.
a) Mean time in condition;
b) - g) Mean rate, percentage mean rate and mean rate per minute
by split time in condition.
h) Total mean reponses in condition.
i) Mean rate per minute in condition.
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Table 1.1 Mean rate of response by centile time in condition
CENTILE
CONDITION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
100,10 8.2 9.3 10.1 11.6 13.4 16.1 18.2 18.0 20.3 18.4
100,0 6.6 5.6 5.4 6.8 10.5 9.5 12.8 13.6 16.4 21.1
0,0 1.5 2.25 1.25 3.0 3.5 4.25 2.25 4.5 2.0 3.0
O o 3.75 2.0 4.0 5.5 6.75 5.0 6.0 11.0 13.5 14.75
0.50 1.4 1.6 1.4 5.2 7.8 8.2 9.2 17.0 20.2 16.0
0.90 3.8 7.4 5.6 5.4 8.0 4.6 5.4 6.2 7.6 6.2
0, 100 3.8 5.7 13.3 16.5 12.5 14.5 21.2 28.0 31.0 33.3
OVERALL 5.1 5.8 6.5 8.2 9.9 10.2 12.2 14.6 16.6 16.8
Table 1.1.1 Difference and percentage difference in rate from 1st to
10th centile by condition
CENTILE
CONDITION 1st 10th DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE 10th/1st
100,10 8.2 18.4 10.2 224
100,0 6.6 21.1 14.5 320
0,0 1.5 3.0 1.5 200
0,10 3.75 14.75 11.0 393
0,50 1.4 16.0 14.6 1143
0,90 3.8 6.2 2.4 163
0,100 3.8 33.3 29.5 876
OVERALL 5.1 16.8 11.7 329
Table 1.1.2 Ranking of condition by difference in rate from 1st to
10th centile
CONDITION DIFFERENCE
1) 0, 100 29.5
2) 0,50 14.6
3) 100,0 14.5




Table 1.1.3 Ranking of condition by percentage difference in rate
from 1st to 10th centile
CONDITION DIFFERENCE
1) 0,50 1143
2) 0, 100 876





Overall results from Table I.1 show a steady increment in rate of
response from 5.1 in the 1st centile to 16.8 in the 10th centile.
teg movement increases by a factor of (x 3) from 1st to 10th centile.
(Diagram 1)
Breakdown of centile results by condition indicates different contri-
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butions to the overall increase. (Diagrams 3, 4 and 5)
Conditions which show the highest rate at the 10th centile are
(0,100), (100,0) and (100,10). Both (0,90) and (0,0) do not show
any major increase in mean rate of response. (0,50) and (0,10) show




Hean percentage rate of response by centile time in con-
CENTILE
CONDITION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
100,10 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.5 8.6 12.0 12.4 13.8 15.5 13.7
100,0 5.8 4.3 5.1 6.2 10.0 8.7 11.1 12.2 15.0 CM
0,0 4.9 6.8 7.1 12.3 13.6 17.2 7.2 17.0 6.2 7.7
0,10 6.3 4.7 6.7 8.3 8.2 6.9 9.9 13.3 16.6 19.6
0.50 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.4 5.8 6.9 10.7 19.9 24.2 17.7
0.90 4.1 128. 7.5 6.1 12.9 7.4 9.2 8.9 16.6 10.0
0,100 1.6 2.7 7.5 9.8 8.0 8.0 12.4 14.7 17.6 17.6
OVERALL 4.9 5.9 6.2 7.2 9.3 9.7 10.9 14.3 15.9 15.6
Table 1.2.1 Difference and percentage difference in percentage rates
from 1st to 10th centile by condition
CONDITION
CENTILE
1st 10th DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE
100,10 5.1 13.7 8.1 269
100,0 5.8 21.4 15.6 369
0,0 4.9 7.7 2.8 257
0,10 6.3 19.6 13.3 311
0,50 3.4 17.7 14.3 520
0,90 4.1 10.0 5.9 243
0,100 1.6 17.6 16.0 1100
OVERALL 4.9 15.6 10.7 318
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Table 1.2.2 Ranking of conditions by difference in percentage rate









Table 1.2.3 Ranking of conditions by percentage difference in per¬
centage from 1st to 10th centile
CONDITION DIFFERENCE
1) 0, 100 1100
2) 0,50 520
3) 100,0 369




Overall results from Table 1.2 display the same pattern as Table 1.1.
Percentage mean rate of response increases by a similar factor (x 3)
from 1st to 10th centile. (Diagram 2)
Percentage results disguise differences in overall rate by condition
therefore contributions to the increase by different conditions are
120
not clarified using percentage rate representation. (Diagrams 6, 7
and 8)
Ranking of conditions by differences and percentage differences in
rate and percentage rate between 1st and 10th centile produced the
following resullts.
RANK
CONDITION DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE TOTAL
in rate difference in % rate difference
in rate in % rate
100,10 5 5 5 5 20
100,0 3 4 2 3 12
0,0 7 6 7 7 27
0, 10 4 3 4 4 15
0,50 2 1 3 2 8
0,90 6 7 6 6 25
0, 100 1 2 1 1 5
Overall ranking by difference bettween 1st and 10th centile is:






LEAST DIFFERENCE - 7) 0,0
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Table 1.3.1 Diffference and percentage difference in mean rate from
1st half (col b) to 2nd half (col e) by condition
CONDITION 1st HALF 2nd HALF DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE
100,10 52.7 90.8 38. 1 172
100,0 33.4 73.4 40 220
0,0 11.5 15.3 3.8 133
0, 10 22 52 30 236
0,50 17.4 70.6 53.2 406
0,90 30.2 30 -0.2 99
0, 100 51.8 128 76.2 247
OVERALL 35 70.5 35.5 201
Table 1.3.2 Ranking of condition by difference in mean rate from 1st
half to 2nd half
RANK CONDITION DIFFERENCE








Table 1.3.3 Ranking of condition by percentage difference in mean









Table 1.3.4 Difference and percentage difference in percentage rate
from 1st half (col c) to 2nd half (col f) by condition
CONDITION 1st HALF 2nd HALF DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE
100,10 32.7 67.3 34.6 206
100,0 31.4 VPCOVP 37.2 218
0,0 46 54 8 117
o o 34.1 65.9 31.8 193
0,50 20.5 79.5 59 388
0,90 44.7 55.3 10.6 124
o oo 29.6 70.4 40.8 238
OVERALL 33.5 66.5 33 199
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Table 1.3.5 Ranking of condition by difference in percentage mean









Table 1.3.6 Ranking of condition by percentage difference in percen¬
tage mean rate from 1st half to 2nd half
RANK CONDITION DIFFERENCE
1 0,50 388







Table 1.3.7 Difference and percentage difference in rate per minute
from 1st half (col d) to 2nd half (col g) by condition
CONDITION 1st HALF 2nd HALF DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE
100,10 17.5 31.7 14.2 181
100,0 9.5 20.3 10.8 214
0,0 11.5 15.25 3.75 133
0,10 7.3 17.3 10.0 237
0,50 5.9 23.9 18.0 405
0,90 9.0 10.5 1.5 117
0,100 15.4 34.4 19.0 223
OVERALL 11.9 23.4 11.5 197
Table 1.3.8 Ranking of condition by difference in mean rate per




3 100,10 • 14.2
4 100,0 10.8




Table 1.3.9 Ranking of condition by percentage difference in mean
rate per minute from 1st half to 2nd half
RANK CONDITION DIFFERENCE
1 0,50 405

















MEAN TIME IN CONDITION
Apart from condition (0,0), mean time in condition varied between 348
seconds for (0,50) and 457 seconds for (0,100). The (0,0) condition
proved aversive to infants, necessitating a decreased time in condi¬
tion. (Diagram 9)
FROM TABLE 1.3.1 to 1-3.6
Ranking of condition by differences and percentage differences in
mean rate and percentage mean rate between 1st half and 2nd half pro¬




























































FROM TABLE 1.3. 7. to 1.3.9
Ranking of condition by difference and percentage difference in mean































Overall ranking by difference in mean rate per minute between 1st











SUMMARY OF GROUP RESULT - INITIAL CONDITIONS
1) Over the 42 visits, the specified behaviour, leg movement,
increased with time spent in condition. (Diagrams 1, 2, 6, 7
and 8)
2) Different conditions made different contributions to the
observed overall increase. (Diagrams 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12}
a) Ranking of condition by differences between 1st and 10th centile
and 1st half and 2nd half, produced consistent results for rate,
percentage rate and rate per minute. Condition (0,50) and
(0,100) produced the greatest differences; condition (0,90) and
(0,0) the least.
b) Tables 1.3.2, I..3.5 and 1.3.8 show that condition (0,90) and
(0,0) produced no differences between 1st half and 2nd half in
terms of rate, percentage rate or rate per minute. (Diagrams
10,11 and 12)
3) Different conditions produce different rates per minute of the
specified behaviour. Condition (0,100) and (100,10) produced
the highest rates per minute, condition (0,90) produced the
lowest. (Diagram 13)






14 infants aged between 13 and 20 weeks provided 25 visits for
transfer conditions.
The conditions for which date was obtained were:





100,10 0, 10 2
100,0 100,10 3
100,0 0,0 2
100,0 0, 100 2
0,0 100,10 4





Table II.1 a) Mean time in condition; b) - g) Mean rate, percentage
rate and mean rate per minute by split time in condition; h) Total






































































































































































Table II.1.1 Difference and percentage difference in mean rate from
1st half (col b) to 2nd half (col e) by condition
CONDITION b) e)
INITIAL TRANSFER 1st HALF 2nd HALF DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE
100,0 100,10 39 46 7 118
0,0 100,10 30.5 48 17.5 157
100,10 . 100,0 52 33.5 -16.5 64
100,10 0,0 29.3 19.3 -10 66
100,0 0,0 35 44 9 125
0,50 0,0 44 42 -2 95
100,10 0,10 51 34 -17 67
0, 100 0,90 33 30.5 -2.5 92
0,90 0,100 13.3 36 22.7 271
100,0 0, 100 35.5 63.5 28 179
OVERALL 34.3 31.3 -3 91
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Table II.1.2 Ranking of condition by difference in mean rate from
1st Half to 2nd Half
RANK CONDITION DIFFERENCE
INITIAL TRANSFER
1 100,0 0, 100 28
2 0,90 0,100 22.7
3 0,0 100,10 17.5
4 100,0 0,0 9
5 100,0 100,10 7
6 0,50 0,0 -2
7 0,100 0,90 -2.5
8 100,10 0,0 -10
9 100,10 100,0 -16.5
10 100,10 0,10 -17
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Table II.1.3 Ranking of condition by percentage difference in mean
rate from 1st half to 2nd half
RANK CONDITION DIFFERENCE
INITIAL TRANSFER
1 0,90 0,100 271
2 100,0 0,100 179
3 0,0 100,10 157
4 100,0 0,0 125
5 100,0 100,10 118
6 0,50 0,0 95
7 0,100 0,90 92
8 100,10 0,10 67
9 100,10 0,0 66
10 100,10 100,0 64
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Table II. 1.4 Difference and percentage difference in percentage mean
rate from 1st half (col c) to 2nd half (col f) by condition
CONDITION c) f)
INITIAL TRANSFER 1st HALF 2nd HALF DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE
100,0 100,10 46 54 8 117
0,0 100,10 47 53 6 113
100,10 100,0 59 41 -18 69.5
100,10 0,0 58.5 41.5 -17 71
100,0 0,0 44.3 55.7 11.4 126
0,50 0,0 51.2 48.4 -2.4 95.3
100,10 0, 10 59.6 40.4 -19.2 68
0, 100 0,90 52 48 -4 92
0,90 0, 100 34.6 65.4 30.8 189
100,0 0, 100 39.1 60.9 21.8 156
OVERALL 48.6 51 .3 2.7 106
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Table II.1.5 Ranking of condition by difference in percentage mean
rate from 1st half to 2nd half
RANK CONDITION DIFFERENCE
INITIAL TRANSFER
1 0,90 0,100 30.8
2 100,0 0,100 21.8
3 100,0 0,0 11.4
4 100,0 100,10 8
5 0,0 100,10 6
6 0,50 0,0 -2.4
7 0,100 0,90 -4
8 100,10 0,0 -17
9 100,10 100,0 -18
10 100,10 0,10 -19.2
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Table II. 1.6 Ranking of condition by percentage difference in per¬
centage mean rate from 1st half to 2nd half
RANK CONDITION DIFFERENCE
INITIAL TRANSFER
1 0,90 0,100 189
2 100,0 0,100 156
3 100,0 0,0 126
4 100,0 100,10 117
5 0,0 100,10 113
6 0,50 0,0 95.3
7 0,100 0,90 92
8 100,10 0,0 71
9 100,10 100,0 69.5
10 100,10 o o 68
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Table II.1.7 Difference and percentage difference in mean rate per
minute from 1st half (col d) to 2nd half (col g) by condition
CONDITION d) g)
INITIAL TRANSFER 1st HALF 2nd HALF DIFFERENCE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE
100,0 100,10 25.75 30 4.25 117
0,0 100,10 12.3 16 3.7 130
100,10 100,0 24 20.9 -3.1 87
100,10 0,0 28.2 19.2 -9 68
100,0 0,0 35 44 9 126
0,50 0,0 44 42 -2 95
100,10 0,10 45 30.9 -14.1 69
0,100 0,90 29.1 28.1 -1 97
0,90 0,100 11.6 19.8 8.2 171
100,0 0, 100 15.6 25.3 9.7 162
OVERALL 24 24.7 0.7 103
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Table II.1.8 Ranking of condition by difference
minute from 1st Half to 2nd Half
in mean rate per
RANK CONDITION DIFFERENCE
INITIAL TRANSFER
1 100,0 0, 100 9.7
2 100,0 0,0 9.0
3 0,90 0,100 8.2
4 100,0 100,10 4.25
5 0,0 100,10 3.7
6 0, 100 0,90 -1
7 0,50 0,0 -2
8 100,10 100,0 -3.1
9 100,10 0,0 -9
10 100,10 0, 10 -14.1
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Table II.1.9 Ranking of condition by percentage difference in mean
rate per minute from 1st half to 2nd half
RANK CONDITION DIFFERENCE
INITIAL TRANSFER
1 0,90 0, 100 171
2 100,0 0, 100 162
3 0,0 100,10 130
4 100,0 0,0 126
5 100,0 100,10 117
6 0, 100 0,90 97
7 0,50 0,0 95
8 100, 10 100,0 87
9 100, 10 0, 10 69
10 100,10 0,0 68
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Table II.1.10 Ranking of condition by rate per minute
RANK CONDITION RATE PER MINUTE
INITIAL TRANSFER
1 0,50 0,0 43
2 100,0 0,0 39.5
3 100,10 0,10 38
4 0, 100 0,90 28.6
5 100,0 100,10 27.7
6 = 100,10 0,0 22.3
6= 100, 10 100,0 22.3
8 100,0 0, 100 20.7
9 0,90 0, 100 15.6
10 0,0 100,10 14.1
143






































































































2 100,0 0, 100
3 100,0 0,0




8 100, 10 0,0
9 100,10 100,0
10 100,10 0, 10
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IEQM TABt-S II. 1
1) Over the 25 visits there is no systematic change in the speci¬
fied behaviour. (Diagrams 15 and 16)
2) Ranking of condition by difference between 1st and 2nd half in
transfer conditions produced consistent results for rate, per¬
centage rate and rate per minute. (See Table II.1.11)
3) Tables II. 1.2, II.1.5 and II. 1.8 show that differences by split
times in transfer conditions are both positive and negative.
In the initial condition differences were insignificant or positive.
In initial conditions specified behaviour increased with time in con¬
dition. (Diagrams 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12)
This is not so in the transfer conditions. Some conditions in
Tables II. 1.2, II.1.5 and II. 1.8 show a decrease in behaviour from
1st half to 2nd half. (Diagrams 15 and 16)
4) Different transfer conditions produce different rates per minute
of the specified behaviour. Transfer condition (0,0) after
initial condition (0,50) produced the highest rate per minute
(43). Transfer condition (100,10) after initial condition (0,0)
produced the lowest rate (14.1). (Diagram 17)
146





































































































































































IEOM TA8DE II-2 sal a)
There is a wide range (-16.7 to 289) in col a): Difference in mean
time in condition. For all, but condition (0,0), differences are
positive. Therefore, the infants' willingness to participate was
decreased in the transfer conditions. The wide range in col a)
makes cols d), g) and i) the most informative.
148




































































































Overall ranking by difference between initial condition and transfer














Overall, rates per minute were higher for transfer conditions then
for initial conditions. This is particularly evident in the col d):
1st half differences. Conditions (x) as a 1st half transfer condi¬
tion elicits more behaviour than condition (x) as a 1st half Initial
condition.
Only three transfer conditions ((100,0), 0,100)); ((0,90), (0,100))
and ((0,0), (100,10)) display an overall decrease in rate per minute
compared with the same conditions presented as initial conditions.
(Diagram 18)
c) Differences between initial conditions and transfer conditions
within visits
150
Table II.3 Initial condition rate of response for time interval
before transfer MINUS transfer condition rate of response for time
interval after transfer
CONDITION TIME INTERVAL FROM TRANSFER (Minutes)
INITIAL TRANSFER 0.25 0.5 1 1.5 2
100,0 100,10 6 7 15.5 17.5 10
0,0 100, 10 2.25 2.25 6 8.25 4.75
100,10 100,0 1 2.5 6.5 11.5 10.5
100, 10 0,0 1 0 5.3 8 17
100,0 0,0 -3 -3.5 0 -20 -38
0,50 0,0 -2 -11 -11 -8 -12
100,10 0, 10 0.5 0 0 -15 -7.5
0,100 0,90 -4 7 7 3 1
0,90 0, 100 -1.7 -4.3 -8 -6 -11.5
100,0 0, 100 3.5 2.5 9 11.5 13.5
OVERALL -1 -0.7 -3.6 -3 -2.4
FROM TABLE II. 3
a) The overall differences between rate of response before transfer
and rate of response after transfer are small for all time
intervals analysed.
b) The following conditions produced a consistent decrease in rate




3) 100, 10 100,0
4) 100,10 0,0
5) 100,0 0,100
c) The following conditions produced a consistent increase in rate
of response for all time intervals after transfer.
1) 100,0 0,0
2) 0,50 0,0
3) 0,90 0, 100
d) Condition 100,10 0,10 showed an initial decrease in rate of
response followed by an increase.
e) Condition 0,100 0,90 showed an initial increase in rate of
response followed by a decrease.
Summary of Group Results - Transfer conditions
a) Within transfer conditions, changes in rate are a function of
the particular condition.
b) Transfer conditions produced higher rates per minute than the
same conditions presented as an initial condition.
c) Difference between rate after transfer and rate before transfer




Date for each subject will be presented under the following headings:
INITIAL CONDITION: Condition (x)
a) Rate by centile time
b) Percentage rate by centile time
c) Split time results
TRANSFER CONDITION: Condition (x) to Condition (y)
a) Rate by centile time
b) Percentage rate by centile time
c) Split time results.
INITIAL CONDITION: 100,10
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
12.1 2 8 3 7 13 14 23 27 22 24
13.1 11 4 20 34 31 19 27 28 28 30
15.2 4 5 2 1 2 6 8 12 14 15
20. 1 0 3 6 6 10 15 24 13 12 5
14.2 0 0 8 1 0 12 7 13 16 21
11.1 4 2 1 4 19 18 27 25 25 8
10, 1 10 3 0 0 9 14 1 13 19 9
42.1 24 16 15 29 19 25 28 16 14 22
44. 1 12 21 27 26 20 19 22 5 30 30
21.1 0 16 9 10 10 16 5 14 14 13
27.1 18 22 23 15 24 26 26 24 20 14
32.1 13 12 7 6 4 9 20 26 29 30
M 8.2 9.3 10.1 11.6 13.4 16.1 13.2 18 20.3 18
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b) Percentage rate by centile time
123456739 10
12.1 1.4 5 . 6 2.1 4.9 9.1 9.9 16.1 18.9 15 . 4 16.8
13.1 4.7 1 *71 . / 3.6 14.7 13.4 3.2 11.6 12 12 12.9
15.2 5.3 7.2 7 9 1.4 i oL. . J 3.7 11.6 17.4 20.3 11 *7C. I . /
20. 1 0 ■J . 6.4 6.4 10.6 16 25.5 13.8 12.3 c 1J . J
14.2 0 0 10.3 1.3 0 15.4 9 16.2 20.5 27
11.1 3.0 1.5 0.7 3.0 14.3 13.5 20.3 1 O 0I 0 . u 13.3 6.0
10.1 12.3 3.8 0 0 11.5 17.9 1.3 16.7 24.4 11.5
42. 1 11.5 7.7 7.2 13.9 9.1 12 13.5 7.7 6.7 10.6
44. 1 5.7 9.9 12.7 12.3 9.4 9 10.4 2 . 4 14.2 14.2
21 . 1 0 15 8.4 9.3 9.3 15 4.7 13.1 13.1 12.1
27. 1 3.5 10.4 10.8 7.1 11.3 12.3 12.3 11.3 9.4 6.6
32. 1 8.3 7.7 4.5 3.8 2.6 5.8 0 01 Z . 0 16.7 13.6 19.2
M 5 . 1 6.1 6.. JL LOkQ 3.6 12 12.4 0 01 0 . U 15.
c) Split time results
Time Rate *R RPM Rate *.R RPM Rate RPM Aye
s In(Seci) 1 stH 1 stH ista 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (week:
12.1 300 33 23.1 13.2 110 76.9 44 143 28.6 13
13.1 400 100 43. 1 30.3 132 56.9 40 232 34.6 13
15.2 200 14 20.3 8.2 55 79.7 32.4 69 20.9 14
20.1 270 25 26.6 11.1 69 73.4 30.7 94 20.9 14
14..2 270 9 11.5 4.0 69 88.5 30.7 78 17.3 15
11.1 480 31 23.3 7.7 102 76.7 25.5 133 16.6 14
10, 1 480 22 28.2 5.5 56 71.8 14 78 9.75 15
42.1 360 103 49.5 34.3 105 50.5 35 208 34.7 18
44.1 360 106 50 35.3 106 50 35.3 212 35.3 18
21.1 420 45 42.1 12.9 62 57.9 17.7 107 15.3 14
27.1 360 102 48. 1 34 110 51.9 36.7 212 35.3 16
32.1 360 42 26.9 14 114 73.1 38 156 26 17
M 355 52.7 32.7 17.5 90.8 67.3 31.7 143.5 24.6 15.1
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TRANSFER CONDITIONS : From 100,10
TO 100.0
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10
10.1 6 3 26 13 18 12 0 5 3 4
11.1 5 10 9 4 5 5 9 12 8 9
M 5.5 6. 5 17.5 11 11.5 8..5 4.5 8.5 5.5 6.'
b) Percentage rate of centile time
SUB 4\ 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9
10.1 6.3 3.2 27. 4 18.9 18.9 12.6 0 5.3 3. 2 4
11.1 6.6 13.2 1 1 . 8 5.3 6.6 6.6 11.8 15.3 10. 5 11
M 6 CnJCO 19. 6 12.1 12.8 9.6 5.9 10.6 6. 9 8
c) Split time re:sults
Time Rate *.R RPM Rate '.R RPM Rate RPM Age
s In(Secs) 1stH 1stH 1 stH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
10.1 400 71 74.7 21.5 24 25.3 7.3 95 14.2 15
11.1 150 33 43.4 26.4 43 56.6 34.4 76 30.4 14
M 275 52 59.1 24 33.5 41 20.9 85.5 22.3 14.5
TO 0,10
a) Rate by centile time
155
SUB 1 2 0J n 5 r0 7 3 9 10
42.1 3 10 r0 r>O n nI 11 rJ 4
44. 1 12 12 12 14 10 * a1 tt n 0 O 3
M 12.5 11 9 11 J .,5 10.5 o eu . J 5.5 *> c■J . -J 6
b) Percentage rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9
42.1 11.4 12.7 7.6 10. 1 11.4 CO kaD 12.7 13.9 6.3
44. 1 13.2 13.2 13.2 15.4 11 15.4 7.7 0 2.2
M 12.3 13 10.4 12.3 11.2 12.2 10.2 7 4.3
c) Split time results
Time Rate *.R RPM Rate *.R RPH Rate RPM Age
s In(Secs) 1stH 1 StH 1stH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
42.1 120 42 53.2 42 37 46.8 37 79 39.5 18
44. 1 150 60 65.9 48 31 34.1 24.8 91 36.4 18
H 135 51 59.6 45 34 40.5 30.9 85 38 18
TO 0,0
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
21 . 1 0 <£. - 4 0 1 0 n/L 0 nL 5
27. 1 11 2 5 9 11 5 0 4 1 0
32. 1 9 10 5 9 10 3 3 10 6 7
M 6.7 0u 4.7 6 7.3 4.3 3.3 4.7 3 *1
b) Percentage rate by centile time
156










































w 11. J 9.6 13.8 9.9 13. O 6.,7 7,.4 6. Q, u 6
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M 136.5 29.3 58.5 28.2 19.3 41.6 19.2 48.7 22.3 15,7
INITIAL CONDITION: 100. 0
a) Rate by centile time
^0
J Z . Z.
">
w> 4 o 0 0 oO 5 c 11 O *30
71 ^ 4 3 3 3 cD 10 16 10 12 16
17.1 7 3 6 7 15 9 6 16 10 15
13.1 *>j 4 3 CJ 5 I *5■J c■J 6 10
1.2 5 0 ru 3 21 3 11 10 16 17
5.1 20 14 10 10 c0 13 30 27 31
4.1 3 6 nz. 10 o 13 29 24 27 23
3. 1 6 4 1 1 11 O 0w J oJ 0 12 13 45
M 6.6 5.6 5.4 6.S 10.5 9.5 12.3 13.6 16.4
b) Percentage rate by centile time
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-> o o
J L . 4.9 6.6 3.3 0 0 A T> Ai J . 1 3.2 3.2 1 °I U 27
27.2 i o-t . J 3.7 3.7 3 . 7 6.1 12.2 19.5 12.2 14.6 19
17.1 7.4 3.2 6.4 7.4 16 3 . o
r j
.0.1 17 10.6 16
13 . 1 6.7 3.9 6.7 11.1 11.1 2.2 6.7 11.1 13.3 22
1.2 4 . 9 0 5.9 7.3 20.6 7. 3 10.3 9 . 3 15.7 16
5 . 1 10.3 7.5 5.4 5 . 4 3.2 9.7 16. 1 14.5 16.7 10
4.1 2. 1 4.1 1 . 4 6.3 r oO . 3.9 19.9 16.4 18.5 15
3 . 1 4.3 0.7 8.0 3.0 16.7 6.5 1 . 4 3.7 13 *> O■J !—
M COin 4 . 3 5 . 1 6.2 10 CO -4 11.1 12.2 15
c) Split time resul ts
Time Rate \R RPM Rate iR RPM Rate RPM Aye
s In(Secs) 1 stH 1stH 1stH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (week:
32.2 360 9 14.8 3 52 85.2 17.3 61 10.2 18
27.2 480 18 22 4.5 64 78 16 8.2 10.2 17
17.1 240 38 40.4 19 56 59.6 28 94 213.5 17
18.1 480 20 44.4 5 25 55.6 6.2 45 5.6 13
1.2 360 40 39.2 13.3 62 60.8 20.7 102 17 20
5.1 540 60 32.3 13.3 126 67.7 28.2 136 20.7 16
4.1 480 30 20.5 7.5 116 79.5 29 146 18.2 14
3.1 600 52 37.7 10.4 86 62.3 17.2 138 13.8 14
H 442.5 33.4 31.4 9.5 73.4 68.6 20.3 106.7 14.9 16.1
TRANSFER CONDITIONS: From 100,0
TO 0,0
a) Rate by centile time
3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10
b) Percentage rate by centile time
c) Split time results
Time Rate '.R RPM Rate *.R RPM Rate RPM Age
S In(Secs) IstH 1stH IstH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks
32.2 120 35 44.3 35 44 55.7 44 79 39.5 ' 18
. o
. 6
8.9 2.2 5.6 10.1 13.5 12.4 9 4.5 10.1 13.5
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TO Q,1£Q
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
18. 1 2 7 5 10 W 20 16 25 21 13
17. 1 6 9 2 4 8 5 6 6 5 10
M 4 8 3.5 7 13 12.5 11 15.5 13 11.5
























M 5.6 9.9 3.4 6.9 13.1 11.4 10.7 14 11.7 12.9
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c) Split time results
Time Rate *.R RPM Rate '.R RPM Rate RPM Age
s In(Secs) 1 stH 1 StH 1stH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
18.1 360 42 30.7 14 95 69.3 31.7 137 22.8 13
17.1 200 29 47.5 17. 1 32 52.5 18.8 61 18.5 17
M 280 35.5 39.1 15.6 63.5 60.9 25.3 99 20.7 15
TO 100. 10
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 nJ 4 5 6 7 3 9 10
4.1 6 11 5 5 OO 1 14 5 7 5
5.1 1 3 3 15 13 3 5 11 13 17
M 7.5 7 4 10 10.5 7.5 9.5 8 10 11
b) Percentage rate by centile time















M 9.1 4.9 11.1 12.: 8.9 1 7
c) Split time results
Time Rate \R RPM Rate \R RPM Rate RPM Age
s In(Secs) 1stH 1stH 1 stH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
4.1 150 35 47.9 28 38 52. 1 39.4 73 29.2 14
5.1 220 43 44.3 23.5 54 55.7 29.5 97 26.2 16
M 135 39 46.1 25.7 46 53.9 29.9 85 77.7 15
INITIAL CONDITION: 0,0
a) Rate by centile time
160
SUB i 2 3 4 5 6 i 8 9 10
20.2 4 4 0 nf 3 6 1 6 4 1
42.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
44.2 2 5 2 3 8 3 7 9 4 11
43. 1 0 0 3 oC. 3 5 1 -5■J 0 0
M 1.5 2.2 1.2 3 3.5 4.2 2.2 4.5 2
b) Percentage rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10
20.2 11.1 11.1 0 19.4 3.3 16.7 2.8 16.7 11.1 2.3
42.2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
42.2 3.7 9.3 3.7 5.6 14.3 5.6 13 16.7 7.4 20.4
43. 1 0 0 17.6 11.8 17.6 29.4 5.9 17.6 0 0
M 6.2 7.6 7.8 11.7 12.7 15.4 7.9 15.2 7.1 8.3
c) Split time results
Time Rate «.R RPM Rate •.R RPM Rate RPM Age
s In(Secs) 1stH 1stH 1 stH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
20.2 120 18 50 18 18 50 18 36 18 15
42.2 *120 0 50 0 0 50 0 0 0 19
44.2 120 20 37 20 34 63 34 54 27 19 '
43.1 120 8 47.1 8 9 52.9 9 17 8.5 21
M 120 11.5 46 11.5 15.2 54 15.2 26.7 13.4 18.5
TRANSFER CONDITION: FROM 0,0
TO 100.10
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 .3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10
20.2 4 1 1 o 6 1 0 1 0 0
42.2 2 0 12 9 3 18 29 15 2 23
44.2 14 12 14 17 15 9 22 17 20 12
43.1 0 1 5 4 0 0 7 4 1 1 1
M CJ 3.5 3 3 6 7 14.5 9.2 5.7 11
b) Percentage rate by centile time
SUB 1 o 2 4 5 6 7 0G 0 10
20.2 25 6. 3 6.3 12.5 37.5 6.3 0 6.3 0 0
42.2 1.8 0 10.6 o 2.7 15.9 25.7 13.3 41 . oo 29.4
44.2 9.2 7. 9 9.2 11.2 9.9 5.9 14.5i 11.2 1 ? . 2 7 .9
43. 1 0 1J 15.2 12.1 0 0 21.2 12 3 33.3
M 9 4. 3 10.3 13.5 12.5 7.0 15.4! 10.7 4. 5 15.4




























































M 322.5 30.5 47 12.3 48 53 16 78.5 14.1 18.5
INITIAL CONDITION: 0,10
a) Rate by centile time









































M 3.7 5.5 6.7 11 13.5 14.7
b) Percentage rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
35. 1 4.9 2.1 4.2 7.7 14.8 10.6 12.7 17.6 16.9 8 .5
38. 1 2.8 2 . 8 12.5 15.3 5.5 6.9 8.3 19.4 11.1 15.3
36.2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
37.2 7.4 3.7 0 0 o r~ nV/ 7.4 6.2 28.4 44.4
M 6.3 4.7 6.7 r» nu . J 8.2 6.9 9.9 13.3 16.6 19.6
c) Split time results
Time Rate *.R RPM Rate *.R RPM Rate RPM Age
S In(Secs) 1stH 1stH 1stH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
35~1 360 48 33~8 16 94 6?72 3775 U2 23?7 18
38.1 360 28 38.9 9.3 44 61.1 14.7 72 12 14
36.2 360 (1 ) 50 0.3 0 50 0 1 0.2 17
37.2 360 11 13.6 3.7 70 86.4 23.3 81 13.5 20
M 360 22 34 . 1 7 .3 52 65.9 17. 3 74 12.4 17. 2
INITIAL CONDITION: 0, 50
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
38.2 0 0 0 23 24 10 15 25 25 18
39. 1 4 2 2 1 1 3 3 13 10 o
35.2 3 5 5 1 0 0 2 4 10 11
37. 1 0 0 0 0 0 9iL 16 14 21 14
36.1 0 1 0 1 14 26 10 29 35 35
M 1.4 1 .6 1 .4 5 .2 7 . 3 3 . 2 9.2 17 20.2! 16
b) Percentage rate by centile time
•
SUB 1 Oc. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
38.2 0 0 0 16.4 17.1 7.1 10.7 17.9 17.9 12.9
39.1 9.8 4.9 4.9 2.4 2.4 7.3 7 3 31.7 24.4 4.9
35.2 7.3 12.2 12.2 2.4 0 0 4.9 9.8 24.4 26.S
37. 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 23.9 20.9 31.3 20.9
36. 1 0 0.7 0 0.7 9.3 17.2 6.6 19.2 23.2 23.2
M 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.4 5.8 6.9 10.7 19.9 24.2 17.7






















38.2 360 47 33.6 15.7 93 66.4 31 140 23.3 15
39.1 300 10 24.4 4 31 75.6 12.4 41 8.2 15
35.2 360 14 34. 1 4.7 27 65.9 9 41 6.8 19
37.1 360 0 0 0 67 100 22.3 67 11.2 19
36.1 360 16 10.6 5.3 135 89.4 45 151 25.2 16
M 348 17.4 20.5 5.9 70.6 79.5 23.9 88 14.9 16.8
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TRANSFER CONDITION: FROM 0,50
TO 0,0
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 10
33.2 8 10 10 10
b) Percentage rate by centile time
SUB 10
11.6 8.1 10.5 11.6
c) Split time results
Time Rate *.R RPM Rate *iR RPM Rate RPM Age
In(Sees) 1stH 1stH IstH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
I8.2 120 44 51.2 44 42 48.8 42 86 43 15
INITIAL CONDITION O >x> o
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 "7/ 8 9 10
15.1 5 0 0 1 9 3 4 14 22 12
14. 1 0 nL 1 1 8 4 5 1 1 J 2
13.2 14 23 22 23 22 14 15 6 2 11
11.2 <J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
10.2 0 12 5 y 1 2 3 0 10 4
7.4 5.4 4.6 5.4 6.2 7.6 6.2
b) Percentage rate by centile time
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SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
15.1 7.1 0 0 1 . 4 12.9 4.3 5.7 20 31 . 4 17.1
14.1 0 5.4 2.7 2.7 21.6 10.8 13.5 29 .7 8.8 5.4
13.2 9.2 15.1 14.5 15.1 14.5 9.2 9.9 3.9 1 . 3 7.2
11.2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
10.2 0 30. 8 12.8 S 1 2.6 5 . 1 7.7 0 25.6 10.3
M 5.3 12.3 8 6.9 12.3 7.9 9.4 12.7 15.3 10
c) Split time resuits
Time Rate %R RPM Rate "iR RFM Rate RPM A<jc
s IntSecs) 1stH 1stH 1stH 2nd!! 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
15.1 240 15 21.4 7.5 55 78.6 27.5 70 17.5 13
14.1 500 12 32.4 • 2.9 25 67.6 6.0 37 4.5 14
13.2 420 104 68.4 29.7 48 31.6 13.7 152 21.7 14
11.2 480 0 50 0 (3) 50 0.7 3 0.4 15
10.2 480 20 51.3 5 19 48.7 4.7 39 4.9
16
M 424 30.2 44.7 9 30 55.3 10.5 60.2 CO 14.4
TRANSFER CONDITION: FROM 0,90
TO 0.100
a) Rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
14.1 3 3 9 6 0 20 36 19 0 6
11.2 2 0 2 2 2 1 5 2 7 1
10.2 0 2 2 5 2 0 4 3 0 4
M 1.7 1.7 4.3 4.3 1.3 7 15 8 2.3 3.7
b) Percentage rate by centile: time
SUB 1 2 0J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
14.1 2.9 2.9 8.8 5.9 0 19.6 35.3 18.6 0 5.9
11.2 8.3 0 8.3 8.3 8.3 4.2 20.8 8.3 29.2 4.2
10.2 0 9 . 1 9.1 22.7 9.1 0 18.2 13.6 0 13.2
M 3.7 4 8.7 12.3 5.8 7.9 24.8 13.5 9.7 9.4
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c) Split time results
Time Rate AR RPM Rate AR RPM Rate RPM Age
S In(Secs) 1stH 1stH 1 s til 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
14.1 400 21 20.6 6.4 81 79.4 24.5 102 15.2 14
11.2 150 8 33.3 6.4 16 66.7 12.8 24 9.6 20
10.2 60 11 50 22 11 50 22 22 22 19
M 203.3 13.3 34.6 11.6 36 65.4 19.8 49.3 15.6 17.7
INITIAL CONDITION: 0 , 100
a) Rate by centile time
SUE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 . 1 9 18 38 27 26 26 27 20 24 30
4.2-
"
1 1 13 10 12 8 10 13 19 16
3.2 0 2 2 14 10 9 20 15 2 18
5.2 5 2 0 15 2 15 23 64 60 69
M 3.8 5.7 13 .3 16 .5 12.5 14.5 21.2 28 31 33.,3
b) Percentage rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 .1 3.7 7.3 15. 5 11 10.6 10.6 11 8.2 9.3 12.2
4.2 1.0 1.0 12. 6 9. 7 11.7 7.8 9.7 12.6 18.4 15.6
3.2 0 1.8 1. 8 12. 6 9 8.1 18 13.5 18.9 16.2
5.2 1.9 0.8 0 5. 8 0.8 5.8 10.8 24.6 23.1 26.5
M 1 .6 2.7 7. 5 9. 8 3 8 12.4 14.7 17.6 17.6
c) Split time results
Time Rate AR RPM Rate AR RPM Rate RPM Age
In(Secs) 1stH IstH 1stH 2ndH 2ndH 2ndH Overall Overall (weeks)
. 1 480 118 48.2 29 .5 127 51.8 31.7 245 30.6 19
.2 360 37 35.9 12 .3 66 64.1 22 103 17.2 15
.2 210 28 25.2 16 .0 83 74.8 47.4 111 31.7 15
.2 780 24 9.2 3 .7 236 90.8 36.3 260 20 17
457.5 51.7 29.6 15 .4 128 70.4 34.4 179.7 24.9 16.5
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—, -i—Kd. uC by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 nu n 10
1 . 1 7 3 3 3 5 1 1 4 10 C 7/
4.2 7 8 4 9 11 8 9 2 3 2
M 7 5.5 6 6 3..5 9.5 6.,5 6 4 4.5
b) Percentage rate by centile time
SUB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 . 8 9 10
1 . 1 10. 9 4.7 12.5 4.7 9.4 17.2 6.3 15.6 7.3 10.9
4.2 11. 1 12.7 6.3 14.3 17.5 12.7 14.3 3.2 4.83 3.2
M 11 8.7 9.4 9.5 13.5 15 10.3 9.4 6.3 7.1






















1.1 120 27 42.2 27 37 57.3 37 64 64 19
4.2 150 39 61.9 31.2 24 38.1 19.2 63 63 15
M 135 33 52. 1 23. 1 30.5 48 28. 1 63.5 63.5 17
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APPENDIX IV
Summary of Individual Data




a) Time in condition.
b) Rate in first minute and maximum rate per minute.
c) Percentage rate by split time.
d) Rate per minute by split time.
e) Affective reaction to condition.
TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (x) TO CONDITION (y) SUBJECTS (n)
a) Time in transfer condition
b) Rate per minute by split time in transfer condition.
c) Change in rate for comparative time periods before and after
transfer.
d) Affective reaction to initiation of transfer






a) Time in condition varied between 200 and 480 seconds.
b) Rate in first minute varied between 2 and 33. Four subjects
produced very high rates (20+) in the first minute. Maximum
rate in any subsequent minute varied between 22 and 60.
c) Percentage rate in the 1st half varied between 11.5 and 50.
Percentage rate in the 2nd half varied between 50 and 88.5
11 subjects increased percentage rate from 1st half to 2nd half.
1 subject maintained the same percentage rate in both halves.
d) Rate per minute in the 1st half varied between 4 and 34.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half varied between 14 and 44.
•11 subjects increased rate per minute between halves.
1 subject maintained the same rate per minute in both halves.
e) 1 subject was excluded from the analysis. 5 subjects were ter¬
minated before transfer because of sudden onset of distress, all
5 had previously appeared content and interested in the condi¬
tion.
There was little vocalisation from all subjects (apart from cry¬
ing from the 5 terminated).
7 subjects were successfully transferred to other conditions.
IV.1.1 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (100,10) TO CONDITION (100,0)
SUBJECTS (2)
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a) Time in transfer condition was 150 seconds and 400 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half of the transfer condition was
21.5 and 26.4
Rate per minute in the 2nd half of the transfer condition was
7.3 and 34.4.
One subject increased rate per minute between halves.
One subject decreased rate per minute between halves.
c) Both subjects reaction to transfer was a decrease in rate from
comparative preceding periods from 15 to 120 seconds.
Initiation of transfer in both cases changed a downward trend in
rate into an upward trend in rate.
d) Neither subject showed any change in affective reaction to ini¬
tiation of transfer.
e) Neither subject showed any change in affective reaction to con¬
tinuation of the transfer condition.
IV.1.2 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (100,10) TO CONDITION (0,10)
SUBJECTS (2)
a) Time in transfer condition was 120 seconds and 150 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half of the transfer condition was 42
and 48.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half of the transfer condition was 37
and 24.8
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Both subjects decreased rate per minute between halves.
c) Reaction to transfer by change in rate for comparative preceding
periods was mixed up to a minute after transfer.
One subject increased rate, one subject decreased rate.
Between 90 and 120 seconds after transfer both subjects
increased rate.
Initiation of transfer produced an initial improved tend and a
dramatic downward trend.
d) On initiation of transfer one subject showed no change in affec¬
tive reaction, the other subject after initial vocalisation
became progressively restless and unhappy.
e) Both subjects were unhappy in the transfer condition and early
termination was necessitated.
IV.1.3 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (100,10) TO CONDITION (0,0)
SUBJECTS (3)
a) Time in transfer condition varied between 80 and 210 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half of the transfer varied between
10 and 43.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half of the transfer varied between
12.9 and 39.
Two subjects decreased rate per minute between halves.
171
One subject increased rate per minute between halves.
c) Reaction to transfer by change in rate from comparative preced¬
ing periods was mixed, up to a minute after transfer. One sub¬
ject increased rate, two subjects decreased rate.
Between 90 seconds and 120 seconds, all subjects decreased rate.
Initiation of transfer in all subjects produced a downward trend
in rate.
d) One subject showed no change in affective reaction.
Two subjects displayed violent affective reaction to initiation
of transfer, characterised by initial vocalisation followed by
crying and random motor activity.
e) One subject was terminated after 80 seconds. Two subjects
after reaching criterion for termination were transferred back
to initial condition. Both subjects were willing to continue
with the experiment after the re-transfer. The transfer condi¬
tion itself, was aversive to all subjects.
IV.2 CONDITION (100,0)
SUBJECTS (10)
a) Time in condition varied between 240 and 600 seconds.
b) Rate in the first minute varied between 2 and 33.
Only one subject produced a very high rate (20+) in the first
minute. Maximum rate in any subsequent minute varied between 28
and 44.
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c) Percentage rate in the 1st half varied between 14.75 and 44.4
Percentage rate in the 2nd half varied between 55..6 and 85.25.
All 8 subjects increased percentage rate between halves.
d) Rate per minute in the 1st half varied between 3 and 19.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half varied between 6.25 and 29.
All subjects increased rate per minute between halves.
e) Two subjects were excluded from the analysis. One subject was
terminated before , transfer because of sudden distress. The
remaining 7 subjects appeared content and interested in the con¬
dition.
There was little vocalisation from all 8 subjects.
7 subjects were successfully transferred to other conditions.
IV.2.1 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (100,0) TO CONDITION (0,0)
SUBJECTS (2)
a) Time in transfer condition was 120 seconds and 30 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half was 35
Rate per minute in the 2nd half was 44.
The subject increased rate per minute between halves.
c) Subjects initial reaction to transfer was mixed. One subject
increased rate followed by termination, the other subjects
decreased rate initially, followed by an increase.
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Initiation of transfer in both cases continued an upward trend
in rate.
d) One subject showed a very violent affective reaction on initia¬
tion of transfer best described as tantrum; this reaction
necessitated immediate termination. The other subject after
initial vocalisation and looking at mother became progressively
restless. After reaching criterion for termination, this sub¬
ject was transferred back to a control condition and settled
down after the re-transfer.
e) The transfer condition, itself, was extremely aversive to both
subjects.
IV.2.2 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (100,0) TO CONDITION (0,100)
SUBJECTS (2)
a) Time in transfer, condition was 200 and 360 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half of the transfer condition was 14
and 17.1.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half of the transfer condition was
31.7 and 18.8.
Both subjects increased rate per minute between halves.
c) Both subjects initial reaction to transfer was a decrease in
rate compared to preceding periods from 15 to 120 seconds.
Initiation of transfer produced a downward trend in rate fol¬
lowed by an upward trend.
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d) Subjects showed similar affective reaction to initiation of
transfer; cessation of all activity, vocalisation and raised
eyebrows.
e) After 2 minutes in the condition, both subjects appeared content
and were willing to continue with the experiment.
IV.2.3 -TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (100,0) TO CONDITION (100,10)
SUBJECTS (3)
/
a) Time in transfer condition was 150 to 220 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half of the transfer condition was 28
and 23.5
Rate per minute in the 2nd half of the transfer condition was
30.4 and 29.5.
Both subjects increased rate per minute between halves.
c) Both subjects reaction to transfer was a decrease in rate for
comparative preceding periods from 15 to 120 seconds.
No clear trends in rate were discernible.
d) One subject displayed a violent affective reaction to initiation
of transfer, this reaction necessitated termination.
Two subjects displayed a similar reaction; initial cessation of
all motor activity and intent regard of the screen.
e) The two subjects successfully transferred appeared content and




a) Time in condition was 120 seconds for all subjects.
b) Rate in the first minute varied between 0 and 20.
Rate in the second minute varied between 0 and 34.
Three subjects maintained the same rate between halves.
One subject increased rate in the second minute.
c) Three subjects maintained the same percentage rate in both
halves.
One subject increased percentage rate between halves from 37°* to
63%.
d) As for b)
e) One subject appeared content in the condition, this subject
remained inert for all the initial condition. Three subjects
were unhappy in the condition; two resorted to chair-chewing,
one to tears.
All four subjects were transferred to another condition. Cri¬
teria for transfer were abandoned and initiation of transfer was
at 120 seconds for all subjects.
IV.3.1 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (0,0) TO CONDITION (100,10)
SUBJECTS (4)
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a) Time in transfer condition varied between 120 and 450 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half of the transfer condition varied
between 2.7 and 24.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half of the transfer condition varied
between 2 and 29.2.
One subject decreased rate per minute between halves.
Three subjects increased rate per minute between halves.
c) One subject increased rate compared to preceding periods from 15
to 120 seconds. This was the previously passive subject.
Three subjects maintained or decreased rate compared to preced¬
ing periods from 15 to 120 seconds.
In three subjects initiation of transfer produced no clear
trends. In the passive subject, initiation of transfer produced
an upward trend on rate.
d) One of the three subjects who had been restless in the initial
condition became progressively more so and was terminated. The
other two appeared content with the transfer condition. The
previously passive subject displayed progressively greater
interest in the transfer condition.
e) The three infants successfully transferred were happy, if not




a) Time in condition was 360 seconds for all subjects.
b) Rate in the first minute varied between 0 and 9.
Maximum rate in any subsequent minute varied between 11 and 53.
c) Percentage rate in the first half varied between 13.6 and 50.
Percentage rate in the 2nd half varied between 50 and 86.4.
Three subjects increased percentage rate from 1st half to 2nd
half.
One subject maintained the same percentage rate.
d) Rate per minute in the 1st half varied between 0.3 and 16.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half varied between 0 and 31.3.
Three subjects increased rate per minute between halves.
One subject remained passive throughout the condition (1
response).
e) Three subjects were terminated before transfer because of pro¬
gressive onset of distress. Only one of these subjects
appeared at any time to be happy and interested in the condi¬
tion.
The passive subject was successfully transferred to a different
condition.
There was no vocalisation, apart from distress, from any of the
subjects.
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IV.4.1 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (0,10) TO CONDITION (0,0)
SUBJECT (1)




a) Time in condition varied between 300 and 360 seconds.
b) Rate in the first minute varied between 0 and 8.
Three subjects produced very low rates of response (0) in the
first minute.
Maximum rate in any subsequent minute varied between 16 and 56.
c) Percentage rate in the 1st half varied between 9 and 34.1.
Percentage rate in the 2nd half varied between 65.9 and 100.
All five subjects increased percentage rate from 1st half to 2nd
half.
d) Rate per minute in the 1st varied between 0 and 15.7.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half varied between 9 and 45.
All five subjects increased rate per minute between halves.
e) Four subjects were terminated before transfer because of pro¬
gressive restlessness. Three subjects appeared initially con¬
tent in the condition. One subject was initially restless, then
settled down. After three minutes in the condition four
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subjects showed all the signs of boredom, random motor activity;
chair-chewing; and progressive restlessness.
There was little vocalisation from all subjects (apart from cry¬
ing shortly before termination).
One subject was successfully transferred to another condition.
IV.5.1 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (0,50) TO CONDITION (0,0)
SUBJECT (1)
a) Time in transfer condition was 120 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half of the transfer condition was
44.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half of the transfer condition was
42.
There was a slight decrease in rate between halves.
c) Subjects reaction to transfer was in increase in rate from com¬
parative preceding periods.
Initiation of transfer changed a downward trend in rate into an
upward trend in rate.
d) There was no change in affective reaction to initiation of
transfer.
e) There was no change in affective reaction to continuation of




a) Time in condition varied between 240 and 500 seconds.
b) Rate in the first minute varied between 0 and 22.
One subject produced a very high rate (22) in the first minute.
One subject produced a very low rate (0) in the first minute.
Maximum rate in any subsequent minute varied between 2 and 41.
c) Percentage rate in the 1st half varied between 21.4 and 68.4
Percentage rate in the 2nd half varied between 31.6 and 78.6
Two subjects increased percentage rate between halves.
One subject decreased percentage rate between halves.
Two subjects maintained percentage rate between halves.
d) Rate per minute in the 1st half varied between 0 and 29.7.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half varied between 0.75 and 27.5.
Three subjects increased rate per minute between halves.
One subject decreased rate per minute between halves.
One subject maintained the same rate per minute between halves.
e) Two subjects were terminated before transfer because of progres¬
sive onset of distress. Three subjects were passive through the
condition.
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There was little vocalisation from all subjects (apart from cry¬
ing from the two terminated).
Three subjects were successfully transferred to another condi¬
tion.
IV.6.1 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (0,90) TO CONDITION (0,100)
SUBJECTS (3)
a) Time in transfer condition varied between 60 and 400 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half of the transfer condition varied
between 6.4 and 22.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half of the transfer condition varied
between 12.8 and 24.5
c) All three subjects reaction to transfer was a maintenance or
increase in rate from comparative preceding periods from 15
seconds to 120 seconds.
Initiation of transfer in all subjects produced an upward trend
in rate.
d) No subject showed any change in affective reaction to initiation
of transfer.
e) One subject appeared happier and more interested in the con¬





a) Time in condition varied between 210 and 780 seconds.
b) Rate in the first minute varied between 1 and 13.
Maximum rate in any subsequent minute varied between 35 and 55.
c) Percentage rate in the 1st half varied between 9.2 and 48.2.
Percentage rate in the 2nd half varied between 51.8 and 90.8.
All four subjects increased percentage rate between halves.
d) Rate per minute in the first half varied between 3.7 and 29.5.
Rate per minute in the 2nd half varied between 22 and 47.4.
All four subjects increased rate per minute between halves.
e) All four subjects appeared happy and interested in the condi¬
tion. Two subjects vocalised in the 2nd half of the condition.
There was very little displacement activity from any of the sub¬
jects in the 2nd half of the condition.
There was an intent regard of the mobile from all subjects.
All four subjects were successfully transferred to another con¬
dition.
IV.7.1 TRANSFER FROM CONDITION (0,100) TO CONDITION (0,90)
SUBJECTS (2)
a) Time in condition was 120 seconds and 150 seconds.
b) Rate per minute in the 1st half of the transfer condition was 27
and 31.2.
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Rate per minute in the 2nd half of the transfer condition was 37
and 19.2.
One subject increased and one subject decreased rate per minute
between halves of the transfer condition.
c) One subject reacted to transfer by a consistent decrease in rate
compared to preceding periods from 15 to 120 seconds.
One subject reacted to transfer by an initial decrease in rate
compared to preceding periods up to 60 seconds; followed by a
slight increase in rate at 90 seconds.
Initiation of transfer in both cases produced a downward trend
in rate.
d) Both subjects exhibited a dramatic affective reaction to initia¬
tion of transfer.
One subject produced an immediate tantrum which necessitated
termination. One subject vocalised for the first time two
seconds after initiation of transfer then abandoned his intent
regard of the mobile.
e) Continuation of the condition proved aversive to the remaining
subject, who became progressively unhappy. On re-transfer to
another condition the subject settled down and was willing to
carry on in the experiment for another four minutes.
(Two of the four subjects transferred to condition (0,90) from condi¬
tion (0,100) were producing a very high rate of response (50+ per
minute). This high rate made transfer impractical. Because the
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mobile was nearly always stationary, the subject could not observe





1) An increment in rate of response by centile time was observed
both overall and in specific conditions. (Diagrams 1, 2, 6, 7
and 8)
2) Different conditions made different contributions to the
observed overall increment.
Conditions (0,0) and (0,90) made little contribution to the
overall increment. Conditions (100,10) and (0,100) made the
greatest contribution to the overall increment. (Diagrams 3, 4
and 5)
3) Condition (0,0) produced a decreased time to criteria for termi¬
nation. (Diagram 9)
4) Split time results delivered consistent results for rate, per¬
centage rate and rate per minute in differences between 1st Half
and 2nd Half by condition.
Conditions (0,50) and (0,100) produced the greatest differences;
conditions (0,90) and (0,0) the least differences. (Diagrams
10,11 and 12)
5) Conditions (100,10) and (0,100) produced the highest rates per
minute. Condition (0,90) produced the lowest rate per minute.
(Diagram 13)
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6) Affective reaction to initial condition varied. Three distinet
affective categories were observed.
Affective reaction to (100,0); (0,100) and (100,10) was content
and interested.
Affective reaction to (0,10); (0,50) and (0,90) was progressive
restlessness.
Affective reaction to (0,0) was immediate antipathy.
TRANSFER CONDITIONS
1) Mean time in transfer conditions to criteria for termination was
less than the mean time in the same condition presented as an
initial condition. (Diagram 9 and 14)
2) Unlike initial conditions, split time differences in transfer
conditions were both positive and negative. (Diagram 15 and 16)
3) Different transfer conditions produced different mean rates per
minute. (Diagram 17)
4) Rates per minute were higher overall in the transfer condition.
(Diagram 18)
5) Affective reaction to transfer conditions varied. Reactions to
transfer conditions were more diverse than reactions to initial
conditions. Transfer condition reactions do not fit easily
into the three categories observed in initial conditions.
























1. Mean rate of response by centile time for initial condition.
2. Mean percentage rate of response by centile time for initial
condition.
3. Mean rate of response by centile time for initial conditions
(100,10) and (0,0).
4. Mean rate of response by centile time for initial conditions
(100,0); (0,0) and (0,50).
5. Mean rate of response by centile time for initial conditions
(0,90) and (0,100).
6. Mean percentage rate of response by centile time for initial
conditions (100,10) and (0,0).
7. Mean percentage rate of response by centile time for initial
conditions (100,0); (0,10) and (0,50).
8. Mean percentage rate of response by centile time for initial
conditions (0,90) and (0,100).
9. Mean time in initial conditions.
10. Difference in mean rate, 1st Half to 2nd Half in initial condi¬
tions .
11. Difference in percentage mean rate, 1st Half to 2nd Half in ini¬
tial conditions.
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12. Difference in rate per minute, 1st Half to 2nd Half in initial
conditions.
13. Mean rate per minute in initial conditions.
14. Mean time in transfer conditions.
15. Difference in percentage mean rate, 1st Half to 2nd Half in
transfer conditions.
16. Difference in rate per minute, 1st Half to 2nd Half in transfer
conditions.
17. Mean rate per minute in transfer .conditions.
18. Difference in mean rate per minute between condition (x) as ini¬
tial condition and condition (x) as transfer condition.
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DIAGRAM 2: Mean percentage rate of response by centile time
for initial conditions.
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 T
1 2 3 A 5 6 7 8 9 10
Centile time
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DIAGRAM 3: Mean rate of response by centile time for initial
conditions (100,10) and (0,0)
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DIAGRAM 4: Mean rate of response by centile time for initial
conditions (100,0); (0,10) and (0,50).
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DIAGRAM 5: Mean rate of response by centile time for initial
conditions (0,90) and (0,100).
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DIAGRAM 6: Mean percentage rate of response by centile time for
initial conditions (100,10) and (0,0).
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DIAGRAM 7: Mean percentage rate of response by centile time for initial
conditions (100,0); (0,10) and (0,50).




DIAGRAM 8: Mean percentage rate of response by centile time for




















DIAGRAM 9: Mean time in initial conditions.
(100,10)(100,0) 0,0 0,10 0,50 0,90 0,100
Condition
DIAGRAM 10: Difference in mean rate, 1st half to 2nd half, in
initial conditions.
100,10 100,0 0,0 0,10 0,50 0,90 0,100
Condition
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DIAGRAM 11: Difference in percentage mean rate, 1st
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Condition
DIAGRAM 12: Difference in rate per minute, 1st half
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DIAGRAM 13: Rate per minute in initial condition.
100,10 100,0 0,0 0,10 0,50 0,90 0,100
Condition
DIAGRAM 14: Mean time in transfer condition
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DIAGRAM 15: Difference in percentage mean rate, 1st half
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DIAGRAM 16: Difference in rate per minute, 1st half to






















DIAGRAM 17: Mean rate per minute in transfer condition
10
DIAGRAM 18: Difference in mean rate per minute between
condition (x) as initial condition and
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